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Abstract
This Article explores some of the legal initiatives and reforms that 
opponents of same-sex marriage in Canada and the United 
States have pushed forward. Despite being animated by a desire 
to dilute the protections for same-sex couples, these reforms 
resulted in “queering” family law, in the sense that they 
functionalized the notion of family. Consequently, two 
cohabiting relatives or friends would be eligible for legal 
recognition, along with all the public and private benefits of such 
recognition. I term these kinds of “unions” and other non-
normative relationships to be “new families.”
The central claim of this Article is thus that new families should 
build alliances with conservative fringe groups and capitalize on 
their common interest in creating legal alternatives to marriage. 
Section I of the Article will provide a primer on the legal 
remedies available to non-normative relationships. Section II 
will engage in a comparative analysis of conservative reforms in 
the United States and Canada that ended up extending 
eligibility requirements to new families, or that, although 
currently restricted to conjugal couples, could constitute a viable 
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model for protecting all new families, if their eligibility 
requirements were amended. Section III tries to operationalize 
legal recognition by analyzing the potential paths to gain it. I 
will first anticipate and respond to criticism surrounding 
recognition of new families, and then will lay the foundation for 
rethinking queer activists’ political action. I will then offer some 
recommendations (a) on the best model for implementation and 
(b) on forming alliances with conservative groups.
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Introduction
The rate of marriage has been falling in Western countries for the 
last few decades,1 but the level of care and commitment among individ-
uals in relationships has by no means diminished. Instead, people are 
investing economically and emotionally in relationships which do not 
resemble the nuclear, romantic, dyadic, heterosexual family.2 I will call 
these non-marital relationships “new families.” New family unions can 
include (but are not limited to) unmarried conjugal couples, queer as-
semblies, polyamorous relationships, siblings, friends, and relatives.3
Each unit of two or more people is a family union. Individuals be-
longing to them are economically and emotionally interdependent and 
live “familyhood”—but often in ways that challenge traditional notions 
of family and conjugality. Consider, for example, siblings who decide to 
1. This is true in a number of Western countries, including Canada, the U.S., the U.K., 
and Italy. As to Canada, see JULIEN D. PAYNE & MARILYN A. PAYNE, CANADIAN 
FAMILY LAW 2 (6th ed. 2015). As to the U.S., see HANDBOOK OF MARRIAGE AND
THE FAMILY 528 (Gary W. Peterson & Kevin R. Bush eds., 2013). As to England 
and Wales, see Claire Miller, Number of People Getting Married is Falling—and Here’s 
the Reason Why, MIRROR ONLINE (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.mirror.co.uk/
lifestyle/sex-relationships/number-people-getting-married-falling-7844282. As to Ita-
ly, see Matrimoni, Separazioni e Divorzi, ISTAT (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.istat.it/
it/files/2016/11/matrimoni-separazioni-divorzi-
2015.pdf?title=Matrimoni%2C+separazioni+e+divorzi+-+14%2Fnov%2F2016+-
+Testo+integrale.pdf%20(last%20visited%20Jul%2029,%202017).
2. See Lois Harder, The State and the Friendships of the Nation: The Case of Nonconjugal 
Relationships in the United States and Canada, 34 J. WOMEN CULT. & SOC’Y 633, 
639 (2009). See also Fiona Williams, RETHINKING FAMILIES 48 (2004) (interpreting 
the increasing diversity in households “as a part of a ‘queering’ of heterosexual rela-
tionships”).
3. The term “conjugal” is a synonym with sexual relationships, and is used here to con-
trast relationships that lack a sexual component. The I use this term intentionally be-
cause of the complexity it has inherited from interpretation by courts in common law 
countries. But conjugality can mean slightly different things in different places. For 
instance, Canadian courts consider sex to be an unnecessary component of a conjugal 
relationship. See infra Section II.B.
164 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R  & L A W [Vol. 25:161
emotionally and financially support each other long-term in a new fami-
ly arrangement. They are not conjugal, in the sense that they are not in 
a romantic or sexual relationship,4 and therefore, they do not share a 
fundamental feature of the archetypal married couple, but they do care 
for each other deeply over the course of their lives. Should financial or 
emotional problems arise, they will be there for each other. They might 
live under the same roof, not only to capitalize on economies of scale, 
but also because when they are home, they recognize each other as fami-
ly. 
The idea of “family” should be defined functionally. This is echoed 
in the definition provided by the American Home Association (“AHA”) 
in 1973. According to the AHA, a “family” is a union of:
[T]wo or more people who share resources, share 
responsibility for decisions, share values and goals, and have 
commitments to one another over time. The family is that 
climate that one ‘comes home to’ and it is the network of 
sharing and commitments that most accurately describes the 
family units, regardless of blood, legal ties, adoption or 
marriage.5
New family forms are “queer” in the sense that they subvert the 
pre-arranged and state-approved “proper way of living” familyhood.6
The state’s promotion of “proper” familyhood—the heterosexual 
nuclear family—is a means of ordering society. The “proper” family has 
the same characteristics as any large system of ordering, whether 
political, economic, social, or literary, in that it endeavors to preserve its
apparent seamlessness at any cost.7 These systems accomplish their 
appearance of uninterrupted continuity in a variety of ways, including 
by concealing disruptive information8 and exercising disciplinary 
4. Brenda Cossman & Bruce Ryder, What is Marriage-Like Like? The Irrelevance of Con-
jugality, 18 CAN. J. FAM. L. 269, 294–300 (2001).
5. NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL 
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 33 (2009).
6. See, e.g., Carla A. Pfeffer, QUEERING FAMILIES: THE POSTMODERN PARTNERSHIPS OF 
CISGENDER WOMEN AND TRANSGENDER MEN (2016) (surveying one example of a 
queer family: that of cisgender women partners of transgender men).
7. Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College of France, 
1975-1976, at 7–8, 179–80 (Bauro Bertani & Alessandro Fontana trans., 2003); see 
also EVE K. SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 71 (1990).
8. Marvin J. Taylor, Queer Things from Old Closets: Libraries—Gay and Lesbian Stud-
ies—Queer Theory, 8 RARE BOOKS & MANUSCRIPTS LIBRARIANSHIP 21, 22–23
(1993).
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power.9 Silencing potentially disruptive knowledge is a condition for the 
very existence of any such system. 
By contrast, queering a system calls attention to deviance, and ex-
poses a system’s fissures, ruptures, and biases.10 This is achieved through 
individual experience that deviates from proscribed steps.11 Since queer-
ing a system undermines that system’s ability to appear seamless, the 
state has an interest in preserving normative families and hiding any dis-
ruptive knowledge, including anything concerning non-traditional fami-
ly forms. This interest is effectuated through explicit state policies, such 
as laws that channel people into marriage, and by other, subtler social 
norms, such as regarding individuals who do not marry as social out-
casts.
Bearing in mind this alternate vision for the family, this Article will 
explore some of the legal initiatives and reforms that opponents of same-
sex marriage in the U.S. and Canada pushed. The schemes were 
designed to shift the focus away from marriage equality for LGBT 
couples and thereby attenuate the expressive benefits of legal recognition 
for all eligible couples.12 These initiatives and reforms expanded many 
protections and benefits for non-married couples. Of course, the 
reforms were fundamentally conservative because they were—and still 
are—animated by a desire to “circumvent stronger legal status for same-
sex relationships.”13 But, ironically and unwittingly, these reforms and 
proposals have resulted in something much closer to a “queer” vision of 
family law. 
Many socially conservative proposals functionalized the notion of 
family to the point of including cohabiting relatives and/or friends—
although not assemblies comprised of more than two adults. Consider, 
for example, the reciprocal or designated beneficiary schemes that have 
been introduced in the United States. Under a designated beneficiary 
scheme, a person can designate a non-spouse (even a sibling) to be the 
beneficiary of some public or private law entitlements. 
Likewise, some religious groups in Arkansas, Arizona, and Louisi-
ana have shown an interest in legalizing alternative family regimes, such 
9. The core disciplinary powers are hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and 
examination. Foucault, supra note 7.
10. Id.
11. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN 
SCIENCES xx-xxi (1973).
12. The phrase “expressive benefits of recognition” refers to the state and social approval 
of the union. Martha Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 667, 671–72 
(2010).
13. Harder, supra note 2, at 648.
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as “covenant” marriages.14 A similar pattern can be found in Alberta, 
Canada, where the Adult Interdependent Relationships Act (AIRA)15
was driven by similar conservative motives.16 Again, the irony is that 
such schemes, despite being touted by ultra-conservative organizations 
or political parties, have resulted in a dramatic pluralization of family 
law regimes.17 The introduction of alternative schemes for protecting 
partnerships—to live alongside traditional marriage—produced a shift 
in favor of the unexplored land of the non-romantic, non-conjugal, or 
otherwise non-traditional family.18
The central claim of this Article is that new families should build 
alliances with conservative fringe groups and capitalize on their com-
mon interest in creating legal alternatives to marriage. While this might 
seem counterintuitive, many of these initiatives hold promise for queer 
activists. Despite differing motives, the pluralization of family forms 
pushed forward by conservatives aligns with queer activists’ interest in 
opposing the state’s hegemonic and normalizing power. 
By contrast, expanding access to traditional marriage holds limited 
potential for non-normative families.19 I believe that marriage is not a 
14. COVENANT MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (John Witte Jr. & Eliza El-
lison eds., 2005) (describing covenant marriages as special forms of marriage requir-
ing premarital counseling and tighter requirements on divorce); see Steven L. Nock, 
Laura A. Sanchez & James D. Wright, COVENANT MARRIAGE: THE MOVEMENT TO 
RECLAIM TRADITION IN AMERICA 1–4 (2008) (defining covenant marriages as a vari-
ant on traditional marriages but with extra requirements, such as premarital counsel-
ing and acceptance of divorce in only limited circumstances, such as adultery, domes-
tic abuse, or a prolonged separation. At present, Arizona, Arkansas, and Louisiana are 
the only three states recognizing this form of “entrenched” marriage).
15. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A-4.5 (Can.).
16. Harder, supra note 2, at 646. The United Kingdom also had a very prominent legisla-
tive debate surrounding the Civil Partnership Act of 2004. See Nicola J. Barker, Why 
Care? ‘Deserving Family Members’ and the Conservative Movement for Broader Family 
Recognition, in VULNERABILITIES, CARE AND FAMILY LAW 59 (Julie Wallbank & Jona-
than Herring eds., 2014). Baroness Ruth Deech’s proposed amendment to the Civil 
Partnership Act of 2004 would have expanded the status of civil partners to siblings 
and grandparents by replacing the phrase “sexual nuclear family” with the phrase “de-
serving family member.” Id. After being approved by the House of Lords, however, 
the House of Commons rejected it. Id. Interestingly, once again, the reasons behind 
its introduction were overt hostility toward same-sex marriage and homophobia: 
statements like “once you recognize same-sex couples, why not two siblings?” were 
made with a clear intent to denigrate the former. Id.
17. Pluralization of family law regimes refers to the introduction of different regimes 
alongside traditional marriage.
18. Harder, supra note 2, at 635 (“Weirdly and perhaps unintentionally, however, it is 
precisely this conservative reactionism that has provided the impetus for increased 
family diversity.”).
19. See infra Section III.B.1.
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tenable option for many progressive people, given its constraining na-
ture and its history of discrimination and abuse of women. 
The constraints of marriage are built on a complex network of 
behavioral expectations that limit the freedom of spouses (whether 
cross-sex or same-sex) throughout their lives.20 The expectations around 
women, marital roles, and having children are part of the bigger web of 
social rules that serve to limit spouses. Against this backdrop, marriage 
operates as a crucial social ordering device.21
Feminist literature has long articulated how marriage has tradition-
ally been a source of discrimination and oppression for women in terms 
of both reproduction and division of labor.22 Under this theoretical 
framework, the marriage equality movement has undermined not only 
queer attempts at pluralizing families, but also women’s liberation: “By 
appropriating familial ideology, lesbians and gay men may be support-
ing the very institutional structures that create and perpetuate women’s 
oppression.”23
Additionally, non-normative families often have many characteris-
tics that do not fit within marriage’s confines.24 Many queer activists 
(holding a so-called “radical pluralist position”) have harshly criticized 
the personal cost of assimilation that same-sex couples bore in order to 
gain access to marriage.25 In the famous essay “Since When Is Marriage 
20. Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV.
1901 (2000).
21. Id. I offer the following personal anecdote by way of elaboration: Last summer I at-
tended the wedding reception of a relative in Southern Italy, a fairly conservative 
place. After the meal, the conversation drifted to the couple having children. The 
bride was 45 years old, and it was unlikely that she would be able to have biological 
children. The people around me knew that and seemed dismayed. The conversation 
went on for about twenty minutes. When I abruptly but quietly said “Let her live her 
life,” they were taken aback, as if my words made no sense to them.
22. See, e.g., TAMARA METZ, UNTYING THE KNOT: MARRIAGE, THE STATE, AND THE 
CASE FOR THEIR DIVORCE (2010) (advocating for the separation of marriage and the 
state, and the introduction of a narrow legal status that includes all intimate caregiv-
ing unions); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Why Marriage?, in MARRIAGE AT THE
CROSSROADS: THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FAMILIES 224 
(Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott eds., 2012).
23. Didi Herman, Are We Family?: Lesbian Rights and Women’s Liberation, 28 OSGOODE 
HALL L.J., 797 (1990). Some scholars went further by associating marriage with slav-
ery or prostitution. See, e.g., KATHY BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY (1971); Roberta 
Hamilton, Women, Wives and Mothers, in RECONSTRUCTING THE CANADIAN 
FAMILY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 3 (Nancy J. Mandell & Ann Duffy eds., 1988).
24. See infra Section III.B.1.
25. See, e.g., MATTILDA BERNSTEIN SYCAMORE, THAT’S REVOLTING!: QUEER STRATEGIES 
FOR RESISTING ASSIMILATION (2008); Jessica R. Feinberg, Avoiding Marriage Tunnel 
Vision, 88 TUL. L. REV. 259 (2013); Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path 
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a Path to Liberation?,” Paula Ettlebrick cautioned against the risk of as-
similation that comes with an extension of marriage to gay couples.26
That concern, shared by many, is that by assimilating into traditional 
marriage, same-sex couples will negate some of the most powerful as-
pects of their union, especially its “different and subversive” nature.27
There is an additional problem here. Not only does marriage equal-
ity hold a limited potential for new families, it also, and more danger-
ously, has undermined the advocacy for pluralistic relationships28 that 
do not necessarily align with a heteronormative married couple.29 The 
marriage equality movement has unwittingly established a new hierar-
chy of socially legitimate relationships: in raising up married same-sex
couples, it necessarily left new or atypical relationships on the margins 
of society.30 This fact has struck a fatal blow to family pluralism in many 
states.31 The interest in extending marriage resulted in a priori opposi-
tion to legal alternatives to marriage, such as domestic partnerships and 
civil unions, because those designations were seen as falling short of 
achieving the same “dignity” as marriage.32 Such progressive skepticism 
to Liberation?, reprinted in WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CARLOS A. BALL & JANE S.
SCHACTER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 683 (3d 
ed. 2008).
26. See Ettelbrick, supra note 25, at 683. Gay litigators rejected her stance, and the posi-
tion expressed in the Family Bill of Rights by Lambda attorney Evan Wolfson, calling 
for an extension of marriage to same-sex families, prevailed. See Nancy D. Polikoff, 
Equality and Justice for Lesbian and Gay Families and Relationships, 61 RUTGERS L.
REV. 529, 536 (2009).
27. Brenda Cossman, Family Inside/Out, 44 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1994).
28. For an overview of the debate surrounding the prevalence of the marriage stance over 
the liberationist fringe, see Polikoff, supra note 26, at 535–36.
29. Feinberg, supra note 25.
30. Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners and Lesbi-
an Legal Theory, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 511, 538 (1990) (“[T]he prospect of lesbian mar-
riage is detrimental because it creates a two-tier system of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ lesbians 
that elevates married lesbian couples over other varieties of lesbian relationships.”); see
also Cossman, supra note 27, at 8; Ettelbrick, supra note 25, at 684 (“[T]he right to 
marry will not transform our society from one that makes narrow, but dramatic, dis-
tinctions between those who are married and those who are not married to one that 
respects and encourages choice of relationships and family diversity.”).
31. Cyril Ghosh, The Emergence of Marriage Equality and the Sad Demise of Civil Unions,
73 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 1 (2017).
32. Before Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), civil unions or domestic partner-
ships effectively denied same-sex couples federal spousal benefits. See Garden State 
Equal. v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336, 367 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013) (holding that the 
law regarding civil unions in New Jersey ran afoul of the state equality clause since it 
implicated a denial of federal benefits).
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toward alternative regimes has frequently resulted in laws that automati-
cally converted them into marriages.33
Even if not directly seeking to repeal civil unions and other re-
gimes, many LGBT advocates downplay such statuses, considering them 
as mere stepping-stones to full marriage.34 By contrast, I argue that al-
ternatives to marriage are better suited for the advancement of all fami-
lies—including heterosexual—for several reasons, including their re-
duced focus on the traditional conjugal family, their plasticity, and, 
often, their simplicity.35 I do not argue for the abolition of marriage for 
couples who currently qualify for it. Instead, I argue that new families 
and queer activists should concentrate on working with conservative 
groups to further their common interest in plural family regimes.
Section I of the Article will provide a primer on the legal options 
available to non-normative relationships. I will attempt to provide a 
comprehensive menu of legal options for future reforms. Section II will 
engage in a comparative analysis of conservative reforms in the U.S. and 
Canada that extended eligibility requirements to new families, and those 
that, although currently restricted to conjugal couples, could constitute 
33. After the U.S. recognized same-sex marriage, states varied in what they did with civil 
partnerships. Some, such as Delaware, decided to forcibly convert civil unions into 
marriages. See Civil Unions and Domestic Partnership Statuses, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/civil-unions-and-
domestic-partnership-statutes.aspx (last updated Nov. 18, 2014). Other states left 
civil unions in place, but attempted to repeal the reciprocal beneficiary scheme. See 
Civil Union Licenses, COOK COUNTY CLERK’S OFFICE, https://www.cookcountyclerk.
com/service/civil-union-licenses (last visited Nov. 11, 2018); Council of the Dist. of 
Columbia Comm. on Pub. Safety & the Judiciary, Report on Bill 18-482, Religious 
Freedom and Civil Marriage Amendment Act of 2009, Gay & Lesbian Activists Alli-
ance (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.glaa.org/archive/2009/b18-482committeereport
1110.pdf. Reactions to these decisions were mixed at best. The forcible conversion of 
civil unions into marriages has been called “sad,” since it sacrifices the potential that 
alternative regimes hold to be meaningfully different from marriage. Ghosh, supra
note 31 (speaking in the heading of her Article of a “Sad Demise of Civil Unions”).
34. See, e.g., Civil Unions: Stepping Stone to Same-Sex Marriage, UNITED FAMILIES 
INTERNATIONAL (Feb. 2, 2011), https://unitedfamilies.org/homosexuality/civil-
unions-stepping-stone-to-same-sex-marriage/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2018) (quoting 
the following excerpt from an ACLU press release: “Although the passage of civil un-
ion legislation represents an important step forward on the road toward full equality 
for LGBT individuals in Illinois, the ACLU continues to work to achieve the free-
dom to marry for all couples.”); Thomas F. Coleman, The Hawaii Legislature Has 
Compelling Reasons to Adopt a Comprehensive Domestic Partnership Act, 5 L. &
SEXUALITY 541, 568 (1995) (arguing in favor of the Reciprocal Beneficiary Act as a 
wise intermediate step toward full equality for same-sex couples).
35. These new regimes tend to be easier to enter into and dissolve, are scarcely formal-
ized, and in the case of designated beneficiary schemes, they set out a very clear and 
short set of benefits that parties can assign to one another by merely checking a box.
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a viable model for protecting all new families if their eligibility require-
ments were amended. In doing so, I will assess how such schemes reflect 
upon the notion of family, and the extent to which they have already 
resulted in family legal pluralism. Section III tries to operationalize legal 
recognition by analyzing the potential paths to gain it. I will first antici-
pate and respond to criticism surrounding recognition of new families, 
and then will lay the ground for rethinking queer activists’ political ac-
tion. I will offer some recommendations on (a) the best model for im-
plementation and (b) how to form alliances with conservative groups.
A. Definitional Section 
1. What is a Family?
The AHA defines family as “two or more people who share re-
sources, share responsibility for decisions, share values and goals, and 
have commitments to one another over time.”36 I believe this definition 
needs to be supplemented with three additional criteria germane to 
identifying a family: 
(1) A free decision to enter into the relationship, made by 
consenting adults,37
(2) A commitment to take responsibility for the other
person(s),38 and
36. POLIKOFF, supra note 5, at 33. When it comes to decisions as to whether parties are 
economically interdependent, I share the view of the Alberta Law Reform Institute
that the criterion should rely on a presumption of reciprocal dependence to avoid 
costly and cumbersome inquiries into personal aspects of the relationship. See
ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, PROPERTY DIVISION: COMMON LAW COUPLES 
AND ADULT INTERDEPENDENT PARTNERS, FINAL REPORT 112, at 46 (June 2018) 
(“Legislated eligibility criteria should instead rely on presumptions. If the relationship 
between two individuals meets certain observable criteria, it should be presumed that 
they have formed an economic partnership or that they intend to share property.”).
37. As I explain further below, minors are not eligible to enter a caregiving relationship 
under the proposed approach. Though children can of course be parented by new
families, this Article contemplates only those family relationships that are “horizon-
tal,” that is, between equal and consenting adults. Within horizontal relationships, I
have made a methodological choice to include both non-conjugal relationships 
(where a sexual component is absent, such as siblings) and non-normative conjugal 
units (which include an unconventional sexual component, as in polyamorous rela-
tionships) in this Article’s analysis.
38. U.S. courts usually adopt similar requirements in determining whether a common 
law marriage exists. In addition to the foregoing, courts also consider also whether the 
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(3) That the relationship be of some duration.39
The first criterion makes it clear that the new family partnership is 
a horizontal relationship. It thus prevents a party from entering into a 
formal, intimate relationship with a minor (a vertical relationship).40
This condition is similarly not met when there is a legal duty of support 
between the family members. For instance, parents who owe a duty of 
care to adult children41 cannot enter into a horizontal relationship with 
that child.42
The second criterion requires investigation into whether the rela-
tionship is maintained upon a willful decision to take responsibility for 
the other person(s). Note, however, that taking responsibility is not 
synonymous with joint legal responsibility for acts committed by anoth-
er person. It merely points to the intention to commit to and take care 
of the other parties to the relationship. In this way, the second criterion 
distinguishes new families from parties merely engaging in sexual or re-
lational behavior without commitment. Legal reforms in this field 
should sort out those relationships that are based on a decision, rather 
members’ welfare is prioritized above that of others. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert 
E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration and the Evolution of Novel Family Re-
lationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 304–05 (2015).
39. I hesitate to include a timeline for qualification, but any legal scheme will likely re-
quire one year or more.
40. The legal definition of “minor” for purposes of the proposed scheme is left to the rel-
evant authority, usually the state or another delegated authority. The state could al-
low persons above or below the age of 16 to enter a horizontal relationship scheme, 
under certain conditions such as parental consent. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 551.103 (Westlaw through P.A. 2018 No. 341, 2018 Reg. Sess. of 99th Mich. Leg. 
2007).
41. Parents might owe a duty of care to their adult children for a number of reasons. For 
example, in the context of separation, child support does not necessarily end when 
children turn 18, especially when the child decides to pursue post-secondary educa-
tion. See, e.g., COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES
10–11 (2017), https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2017/09/01/2017-child-
support-guidelines.pdf (follow “2017 Child Support Guidelines” hyperlink).
42. One might wonder whether a lack of consent occurs whenever a party feels pressured 
into the relationship due to moral or social reasons. An example might be the case of 
an old and disabled aunt, who has no relatives left alive except her young nephew. In 
this case, the nephew will be socially and intimately persuaded that his aunt needs 
care, and will thus likely take on the burden of caring for her. In such a case, no legal 
duty to support her can be traced to him, but still, the factual context generates a so-
cial and moral duty which is, to some extent, tantamount to a legal one. The factual 
situation exerts such pressure on the nephew that no genuine and spontaneous hori-
zontal relationship can be deemed present. Even so, I believe that this case is no ex-
ception to the notion of consent and that the nephew, if willing to enter a formal re-
lationship with the aunt, should be allowed to do so.
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than a presumption (as would be the case with marriage), to take re-
sponsibility for one or more other persons. Such a functional inquiry 
will help identify those relationships that deserve material benefits. 
The third criterion, duration, is necessary to ensure that the parties 
are emotionally and economically committed. While the creation of 
such commitment and the amount of time necessary to form it is highly 
subjective, a legal regime will necessarily require a fixed duration.43 A
more objective criterion requiring the relationship to be of some dura-
tion is useful in distinguishing extemporaneous relationships from more
solid ones. I believe that a durational requirement below one year would 
pose problems in terms of administrability, as it would be complicated 
for an administrator to verify that the relationship is enduring.44
The definition provided above, however, is of general applicability. 
The answer to the question “what kind of caregiving is relevant for 
purposes of this Article?” is context-specific and depends on the model 
of recognition for new families—whether registration, ascription, or 
contract. This general definition will therefore have to be adjusted 
according to the model of recognition. 
As will be discussed more below, some models, such as registration 
schemes and contractual models, restrict themselves to establishing eli-
gibility criteria.45 Parties who meet the eligibility criteria have the possi-
43. Heather Conway & Philip Girard, ‘No Place Like Home’: The Search for a Legal 
Framework for Cohabitants and the Family Home in Canada and Britain, 30 QUEEN’S
L.J. 715, 730 (2005) (“[A]t some necessarily arbitrary point, one can infer that the 
‘trial’ period of a relationship has passed, such that it is reasonable to consider a 
commitment to exist.”).
44. Ultimately, there is another criterion that could be helpful in distinguishing deserving 
caregiving relationships from non-deserving relationships: the absence of a unilateral 
direction in care. The criterion means that there is a virtual symmetry in the distribu-
tion of caregiving dutiest. Dependency is a different basis on which relationships can 
unfold and deserves a specific legal framework, for that type of care needs to be re-
warded in special ways (for example, through disability benefits and/or compensation 
for private care). See MARTHA A. FINEMAN, AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF 
DEPENDENCY (2004); Martha A. Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1403 (2001); MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL 
FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Martha A. Fineman, 
The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251 (2010–2011); 
Martha A. Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 239, 240 (2001).  I 
decided to omit this criterion because I believe its inclusion would have had a dis-
criminatory impact on people with disabilities. It is also unnecessary. Whenever a 
disability affects the ability of the party to fully consent to a relationship, the lack of 
consent is itself a sufficient bar to recognizing the relationship. When the disability
does not vitiate the party’s ability to consent, there is no valid reason for preventing a 
person, however vulnerable, from entering into the relationship.
45. See infra Section I.A, C.
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bility of self-designating their beneficiary. Thus, for these two models, 
policymakers only need to fix the formal eligibility criteria, such as the 
number of persons able to formalize the relationship, and the type of the 
qualifying relationship (whether it applies to relatives and/or friends, 
conjugal and/or non-conjugal families, etc.).46
In any such case, one of the first decisions in drafting eligibility cri-
teria is to resolve the formal versus functional inquiry that the scheme 
commands. For example, a formal inquiry might only ask: Are these two 
unmarried people, who are consenting adults and of sound mind? If so, 
they are eligible to become a family.47 By contrast, a functional inquiry 
would examine the characteristics of the relationship, and ask: Are these 
two unmarried individuals in a committed relationship?48 Or are they in 
a mutually caregiving relationship? Functional definitions would always 
be more flexible and could include a larger number of families. But they 
might require an intrusion into the private sphere of the family unit, 
and they are difficult and costly to administer. By contrast, formal crite-
ria are easier to verify and are more respectful of autonomy because they 
leave space for self-designation. Unlike registration and contracts, an as-
criptive system ascribes a status to parties who meet the eligibility crite-
ria, regardless of the will (or actions) of such parties. Therefore, it is nec-
essary to define what the conditions should be for ascription. The 
criterion referring to a commitment to take responsibility for the other 
person(s) in the relationship is incompatible with this model, since as-
cription operates on the assumption that once functional characteristics 
are detected, the status must be ascribed regardless of the parties’ will.
Legal scholarship employs several terms to refer to new family 
relationships, partly because this field of scholarship is still a work in 
progress, and partly because there is intrinsic difficulty in employing 
analytical linguistic categories. Being aware of the “symbolic power of 
legal kinship terminology,” one needs to choose one’s words with the 
46. Thus, for contracts and registration schemes, legislators should use the first and sec-
ond criteria to define eligibility criteria. By contrast, legislators should not use the 
third criterion, duration. This is because contracts and registration models rest on 
self-authorship: Any individual can decide to designate someone as beneficiary and/or 
to acquire a status, without having to demonstrate that the relationship is of some 
duration (just as two people marrying do not have to demonstrate the duration of 
their relationship).
47. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(1) (Westlaw through 2018, 2d Reg. Sess. of 
71st Gen. Assemb.).
48. D.C. CODE ANN. § 32–701 to 710 (Westlaw through July 27, 2018).
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utmost care, so as to avoid the risks of regulation, normalization, and 
exclusion inherent in ordinary linguistic labels.49
For the purposes of this Article, I use phrases such as “aspiring nov-
el families,” “non-normative relationships,” “adult horizontal relation-
ships,” “new kinship unions,” and “unmarried family units,” but not en-
tirely synonymously. Although they refer to the same subject—the new, 
unconventional family—they stress different aspects of the relationship, 
such as the lack of benefits or recognition, the lack of characteristics 
consistent with the nuclear family, or the horizontality of the relation-
ship. By contrast, terms like “families,” “family units,” and “relation-
ships” are used interchangeably.
(i) Aspiring novel family units: This is a broad conception of the 
family that includes any group of people, related or unrelated, who en-
gage in caregiving but whose relationship is not yet legally recognized. 
The term emphasizes the political agency of new family groups and their 
quest for legal recognition. 
(ii) Non-normative relationships: This term refers to relationships 
that do not comply with the norm of the ideal marital couple, as accept-
ed in the Western socio-legal culture—the nuclear, romantic, dyadic, 
heterosexual family. “Non-normative” need not mean “unregulated.” 
Non-normative family formations have historically slipped under the 
radar of the law, as in the case of non-conjugal relationships in Alberta, 
and some will continue to do so. 
(iii) Adult horizontal relationships (or adult-adult relationships): 
This term refers to a relationship that two or more consenting adults en-
ter into, regardless of children. I used the phrase to underline the dis-
tinction between the asymmetrical “vertical” relationship between chil-
dren and parents, and the symmetrical “horizontal” relationship of 
consenting adults.50
(iv) Non-marital family units: This is a broad phrase that encom-
passes all families developed outside of wedlock. The term places em-
phasis on the divide between marital couples and new families, and re-
minds the reader that new families are excluded from the standard
package of marital benefits, like tax breaks, evidentiary privileges, etc. 
Marriage is still, much to the distaste of many, the “reigning proxy” for 
49. Frederik Swennen & Mariano Croce, The Symbolic Power of Legal Kinship Terminolo-
gy: An Analysis of ‘Co-motherhood’ and ‘Duo-motherhood’ in Belgium and the Nether-
lands, 25 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 181 (2016).
50. Note that the symmetry is just potential. All adult-adult relationships involve some 
form of asymmetry at some point, as one of the parties may experience special prob-
lems or vulnerability and require additional support.
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relationships deserving of special status.51 The “unmarried unit” is thus a 
viable linguistic option because it captures the nuanced landscape of 
families who do not take on marital status. 
(v) New kinship unions/networks: This term draws on the seman-
tic richness of “kinship” to refer to new families.52 For example, the 
translation of “kinship” into Italian, my native language, results in either 
parentela, which means “family,” or affinità, which means “friendship” 
or “affinity.” This beautiful polysemous term thus contains both the 
sense of mutual affinity and the shared consciousness of belonging to a 
family, which are foundational aspects of new family formations. 
Hence, this term can be used as a catch-all for all new families.
2. What is Recognition?
When using the term “recognition” without more, this Article re-
fers to legal recognition, not cultural or social recognition. Within the 
category of legal recognition, it will be important to distinguish between 
formal and functional recognition. Formal recognition refers to the au-
tomatic legal consequences that attach to certain statuses, such as mar-
riage, civil partnership, or the birth of a child. When partners register 
their relationship, as in a marriage or a civil union, they are seeking 
formal recognition.53
By contrast, functional recognition will attach some legal conse-
quences to relationships that do not have a legal status, but are func-
tionally equivalent to relationships that are legally protected. A couple in 
a common law marriage can seek survivorship benefits despite having no 
formal recognition because the jurisdiction recognizes the union as be-
ing functionally equivalent to marriage.54 As discussed below, ascription 
is a functional mechanism for recognition because it attaches specific 
51. CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 108 
(2010); Nancy F. Cott, The Public State, in JUST MARRIAGE 33 (Mary Lyndon Shan-
ley, Joshua Cohen & Deborah Chasman eds.) (2004).
52. I intend to adopt a broad and inclusive definition of kinship, encompassing both 
blood ties and interpersonal affinity. See Jane E. Cross, Nan Palmer, & Charlene L. 
Smith, Kinship Groups that Deserve Benefits, 78 MISS. L.J. 791, 797 (2009).
53. Robert Leckey, Families in the Eyes of the Law: Contemporary Challenges and the Grip 
of the Past 15(8) IRPP CHOICES 1, 13 (2009).
54. This is the case, for example, with common law couples in countries such as Canada, 
where the status is ascribed by government agencies seeking to combat welfare fraud. 
See infra Section I.B.
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consequences to couples that are deemed to resemble formally recog-
nized relationships.55
Before continuing to the next section, it is important to clarify the 
legal consequences that attach to recognition, namely, “rights and obli-
gations,” “benefits,” “prerogatives,” and “status.”  
The term “rights and obligations” usually refers to the private law 
consequences of a regime, which can include property rights, succession 
rights, health-related rights (or prerogatives) such as the right to make 
decision vis-à-vis human remains or anatomical gifts, and support obli-
gations (throughout the relationship or upon its dissolution).
The term “benefit” can be used in two ways: (i) as a catch-all term 
to refer to material benefits (under both private and public law) and 
immaterial benefits (such as the dignity that recognition can confer up-
on recognized families) or (ii) as a term referring to the legal conse-
quences under public law, i.e., government benefits like social security, 
welfare, tax allowances, etc. I use the term “prerogative” as a synonym 
for public and private law “benefits,” especially in referring to health-
related rights, such as visitation or medical decision-making. 
And finally, “status” refers to the official position of the parties in a 
relationship in society and before the law. If the parties acquire status,
they are no longer seen as “single” before the law, but as “civil partners,” 
“domestic partners,” and the like. Marriage, like many registration-
based regimes, gives its participants a new legal status. Ascriptive re-
gimes, by contrast, do not confer a unitary status—parties continue to 
be considered legally single for some purposes, and family for other pur-
poses.56
55. Id.
56. The “pacte civil de solidarité” (PACS) is a contractual partnership whereby two per-
sons in France can govern some aspects of their relationship under agreed-upon 
terms. See Joelle Godard, PACS Seven Years On: Is It Moving Towards Marriage?, 21
INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 310, 317 (2007). At the outset, the contract did not confer a 
status, and thus parties remained officially single. Id. In 2006, the law was amended 
to the effect that the contract now confers a status (the parties become “pacsés”). Id.
Whether to consider PACS as recognition conferred under the contractual or the reg-
istration model is an open question, but because they now confer a status and because
legal consequences arise upon registration, I think of them as belonging under the 
registration umbrella.
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Section I
Abstract Models to Recognize Non-Marital Families 
This section provides a primer on the models for recognizing rela-
tionships other than marriage. This background knowledge will be nec-
essary to understand the conservative legal initiatives that will be dealt 
with in Section II. The models of recognition are the contractual model, 
the ascription model, the registration model, and various combinations 
of the three. 
A. Contractual Model
The contractual model allows parties to structure their relationship 
through contracts and wills, regardless of formal recognition.57 Through 
cohabitation and caregiving arrangements, parties can take on marriage-
like obligations and design a property regime similar to that of a married 
couple.58 Through wills, a person can designate a beneficiary to inherit 
property, just as married couples do.59
At present, individuals can achieve some of the benefits of family 
pluralism through private contracts like prenuptial agreements and
health care proxies.60 However, not all of the legal protections of 
marriage can be assigned by contract. For instance, in the U.S., a person 
cannot freely assign Social Security benefits, health insurance benefits, 
or rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act.61 In Québec, one of 
Canada’s civil law provinces, public law government programs recognize 
unmarried couples on a functional basis, but such couples are always 
legal strangers when it comes to private family law.62 Thus, a pure 
contractual model (where all family-related matters are dealt with by 
57. LAW COMM’N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING 
CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS 115 (2001), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1720747&rec=1&srcabs=1524246&alg=7&pos=3 (follow 
“Download This Paper” hyperlink). Even though wills are not technically “con-
tracts,” I refer to a “contractual model” for its more immediate evocative power.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 231 (2007).
61. Id.
62. Leckey, supra note 53, at 14. In Québec, de facto couples continue to be excluded 
from all the remaining prerogatives in the field of succession. See Brigitte Lefebvre, 
Récents développements en droit des successions: Le droit québécois, 14 ELECTRONIC J.
COMP. L. 23 (2010). Unmarried partners can inherit only by will and cannot make 
gifts of future property. Id.
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contract) would require that current laws and regulations be amended to 
allow for a broader array of benefits.
The contractual model is characterized by a high degree of flexibil-
ity since it allows parties to design the bundle of rights and obligations 
that they deem appropriate, within the limits outlined above.63 By con-
trast, marriage and registration systems usually provide for a standard set 
of rights and obligations that automatically accrue through those status-
es, with some minor deviations. The contract’s tailor-made nature is just 
a surface advantage; its most valuable asset is its ability to enhance per-
sonal autonomy. A legal contract allows the parties to articulate their 
own expectations, as to “forge one’s own contractual regime and negoti-
ate the terms of one’s commitment [is] a valued tool in a free society.”64
The contractual model’s benefits are also its shortcomings. This 
model works best when parties participate on equal footing with each 
other in the drafting of the agreement, share a relatively similar 
knowledge, and have balanced bargaining powers.65 When this is not the 
case, it is right to be concerned about the vulnerability of the weaker 
party.66 This factor alone may outweigh the benefits of autonomy and 
contractual freedom.67
Additionally, private contractual law is cumbersome because it re-
quires that parties invest a substantial amount of time and effort in 
reaching an agreement. The cost of agreement includes both direct 
costs—the legal fees required to enter into the contract—and indirect 
costs—spending time, effort, and energy entering into a mutually bene-
ficial contract.68 Contracting also generates emotional costs for the par-
ties. First, parties must articulate their expectations for the relationship.
This could lead parties to develop an adversarial mentality that might 
result in negative feelings surrounding the negotiations.69 Agreements 
also suffer from an optimism bias. Any illusions about the likely length 
of the relationship or their own capacity to resolve future controversies 
63. See, e.g., LAW COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 57, at 115.
64. Id.
65. See Leckey, supra note 53, at 12.
66. METZ, supra note 22, at 126 (arguing that caregiving itself creates vulnerability).
67. See Leckey, supra note 53, at 12.
68. See Helen Reece, Leaping Without Looking, in AFTER LEGAL EQUALITY: FAMILY, SEX,
KINSHIP 119 (Robert Leckey ed., 2015).
69. Id. at 120.
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will undermine parties’ ability to accurately articulate their expecta-
tions.70 It is unrealistic to think that these costs will not be relevant.  
Furthermore, there is one key limitation to the contractual model 
that hinders any further analysis: contracts are binding on parties, not 
on the government. The consequence is that such arrangements are to 
some extent “invisible” in the eyes of the state and irrelevant for its so-
cial law apparatus.71 Through contracts, families can only regulate areas 
at free disposition of parties, such as property and financial aspects of 
cohabitation. Public benefits do not fall within this area. Thus, many 
families using contracts to overcome this invisibility find themselves in a 
position where they can only achieve a very limited array of benefits and 
rights. 
The Law Reform Commission of Canada (“the Commission”), a 
public body advising the Canadian government on family law, has iden-
tified two more problems associated with the contractual model.72
1. Lack of “certainty.”73 The Commission reported that “through-
out [their] consultations, it became clear that simply allowing people the 
option to enter into private contracts . . . was insufficient because . . . it 
[did not] offer sufficient guarantee of certainty.”74 Contracts create un-
certainty because they lead to non-uniform legal regimes, which are ad-
ministratively difficult to manage. 
The Commission’s language can also be read in reference to the 
couple’s uncertainty if their contractual language is unclear. There are 
many unpredictable but potentially relevant aspects of a relationship 
(e.g., rules for sharing property, child rearing, support upon dissolution 
of the relationship, etc.) that can be difficult for parties to foresee. I 
share this concern. It is unrealistic to think that the contract will 
articulate all of the parties’ expectations. This is a shortcoming that 
needs to be taken into account when choosing amongst different 
models. 
2. “Lack of official record of those private agreements.”75 The lack 
of a publicly-held record would, in the words of the Commission, 
prevent the “efficient administration of laws and programs where 
70. See Anne Barlow, LEGAL RATIONALITY AND FAMILY PROPERTY, in SHARING LIVES,
DIVIDING ASSETS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY 34 (Joanna K. Miles & Rebecca 
Probert eds., 2009).
71. Leckey, supra note 53, at 12.
72. LAW COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 57, at 114.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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relationships could be relevant.”76 But this is not an intrinsic feature of 
the model. Recently proposed legislation in Missouri and Alabama 
shows that the state could start recording common contracts through its 
clerks without many additional administrative costs.77 The 
Commission’s concern can therefore be addressed through a system that 
sets forth the eligibility conditions to enter the contract, and asks the 
state administration to merely check that such conditions are met. 
B. Ascription
Under the ascription model, legal recognition (and legal conse-
quences) attach to cohabiting partners, whether they seek it or not.78
Under an ascriptive regime, unmarried partners are conferred with mari-
tal-like rights and obligations, but not legal status.79 I believe such a sys-
tem is premised on the assumption that there is little difference between 
marriage and cohabitation. Ascription is a functional, rather than for-
mal, system of recognition, in the sense that it inquires whether the par-
ties “have functioned similarly to the members of formally recognized 
family relationships,” such as marriage.80 Generally, the legal conse-
quences flowing from ascription fall within the scope of private law (re-
ciprocal rights and obligations) or public law (a package of social bene-
fits and tax exemptions).81
This model is already implemented in many jurisdictions as 
“common law marriage,” and it could extend to non-normative rela-
tionships—with some caveats. Such is the case in Alberta, Canada, 
where any two persons (including friends, but excluding relatives) will 
acquire the status of “Adult Interdependent Partners” if they live in a 
three-year, interdependent relationship, or in a relationship “of some 
permanence” while raising a child.82
Unlike the contractual model, which demands an articulation of 
the parties’ expectations and then crystallizes them in a contract, ascrip-
tion operates when there is no previously verbalized set of expectations. 
In this sense, the model can remedy inequalities and unarticulated de-
76. Id.
77. S. 13, 2018 Sess. (Ala. 2018), https://legiscan.com/AL/bill/SB13/2018;
H.B. 1434, 2018 Sess. (Mo. 2018), https://legiscan.com/MO/bill/HB1434/2018.
78. Leckey, supra note 53, at 12.
79. LAW COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 57, at 116.
80. Leckey, supra note 53, at 3.
81. Id. at 12.
82. See infra Section II.B.
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sires—especially for women, who are more likely to be the vulnerable 
party.83 The system purports to prevent exploitation and impose obliga-
tions that correspond to the expectations of the majority of couples.84
While there are some families who choose not to marry, many partners 
“drift into” cohabitation and can overlook the consequences of the new 
arrangement.85 Ascription is intended to correct this problem.
My view is that this system cannot truly apply to aspiring family 
formations. It is imperative that parties in new families attempt to artic-
ulate their desires for their relationship, since they are inherently new
and non-normative. It would be a mistake for a non-traditional family 
to rely on traditional notions of familyhood. New families have charac-
teristics—who they love and how—that are unique by definition, and 
the category of new family is too heterogeneous to expect the state to 
make a great effort in categorizing or according the appropriate benefits 
to all of them. By articulating their desires and expectations, new fami-
lies also avoid the risk of assimilating into a hegemonic norm, as with 
state categorization.86
Additionally, ascription can infringe on personal autonomy.87 Par-
ties in committed relationships—especially the wealthier party—might 
not intend to bind themselves in a marriage-like arrangement. Some 
scholarship has aptly referred to ascription as “conscription,” emphasiz-
ing the compulsory nature of the regime.88 Under an ascriptive regime, 
parties not only fail to consent to the regime, but might also lack aware-
ness that consequences have attached at all.89 Efforts can be made to 
raise public awareness about the consequences of an ascriptive regime, 
83. Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality, 3 OSLO L. REV.
133, 136–38 n.6–16 (2017) (challenging the idea of marriage as a partnership be-
tween equals, and analyzing the multiple contexts showing that it was and is a gen-
der-dependent union, such as accumulation of property and divorce).
84. Leckey, supra note 53, at 12.
85. Winifred Holland, Intimate Relationships in the New Millennium: The Assimilation of 
Marriage and Cohabitation?, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 114, 151–67 (2000).
86. Foucault has described how normalization operates by describing a four-step ap-
proach whereby the state: (i) eliminates or disqualifies what it terms as useless and ir-
reducible; (ii) normalizes remaining knowledges to make them communicate and fit 
together; (iii) creates a hierarchy of knowledge, whereby the most particular and least
generalizable knowledges become subordinated; (iv) builds a pyramidal centralization 
that enables it to control these knowledges. Foucault, supra note 7, at 180.
87. LAW COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 57, at 116.
88. Marsha Garrison, Reviving Marriage: Could We? Should We?, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
279, 296 (2008).
89. Id. (“Although people may opt out of certain statutory provisions governing their 
relationships, they are not always aware of this possibility.”).
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when enacted, but even so, the autonomy conundrum might be difficult 
to overcome. 
A serious shortcoming of the ascription model also lies in its over-
inclusive nature. This danger is clear in the case of conjugal relation-
ships, such as common law couples. Once statutory conditions are met, 
all couples are treated alike, regardless of their concrete attributes.90 The 
same over-inclusion might arise in the case of non-conjugal relation-
ships. This shortcoming could be further accentuated if one considers 
that, absent a sexual component within the relationship, two roommates 
or friends who do not wish to bind themselves could become family in 
the eyes of the law if the eligibility requirements are easy enough to 
meet (e.g., mere cohabitation). There is no bright line that separates a 
friend from an interdependent life partner. Given the difficulty in de-
termining the economic and emotional link between these parties, any 
ascriptive mechanism is likely to be fraught with error. 
There are different means of implementing an ascription model. 
When attachment of the legal consequences occurs independent of the 
request of any of the parties, it is called “pure ascription.”91 Conversely, 
when recognition comes at a partner’s request, it is called “partial ascrip-
tion.”92
1. Purely Ascriptive Recognition
There are many examples of purely ascriptive recognition. Finan-
cial aid for university students in the U.S. is allocated purely by ascrip-
tion: public financial aid awards may be reduced if the lender learns that 
the student’s unmarried parents are in a marriage-like relationship.93
This reduction occurs independent of a request by the student or her par-
ents. 
90. LAW COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 57, at 116. See also discussion infra Introduction, 
Section A.
91. Erez Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1276, 1313 (2014).
92. Id. at 1313–33 (offering an account of the difference between pure and partial ascrip-
tion). Legal scholarship does not always distinguish between these two types of ascrip-
tion. However, cases triggering pure and partial ascription are qualitatively different, 
and deserve an ad hoc analysis.
93. Rebecca Klein, FAFSA Changes to Recognize Same-Sex Parents by 2014, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Apr. 30, 2013, 1:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/30/fafsa-
changessame-sex-parents-2014_n_3185755.html; Erez Aloni, Relationship Recogni-
tion Madness, HUFFINGTON POST (June 12, 2013, 1:10 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/erez-aloni/relationship-recognition-madness_b_3422346.
html?utm_hp_ref=college&ir=College#es_share_ended. 
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Ascription is more problematic when it deals with legal recognition 
that neither party seeks. It can also have significant draconian effects on 
a new family. In a pure ascriptive regime, state recognition might result 
in economic injustice: for example, by determining, via ascription, that 
a family is no longer entitled to a public benefit.94 This phenomenon is 
called “deprivative recognition,”95 and is particularly acute in the context 
of government welfare benefits.96 For example, in California, Oklaho-
ma, and Kansas, an unmarried adult male residing in the house can re-
sult in termination or reduction of the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF)—a federal welfare program that helps needy children 
and their families.97
Pure ascription can also bring about economic maldistribution in 
that it deprives parties of the benefits of singlehood, but does not simul-
taneously confer the economic privileges of family status (such as tax ex-
emptions).98 It is thus an asymmetrical system which can result in depri-
vation and economic injustice for new families. 
2. Partially Ascriptive Recognition
“Partial ascription” models require that at least one party initiates 
an action. For example, in many places, upon dissolution of an unmar-
ried partnership, a party can bring a claim for maintenance.99 The court 
will inquire into the nature of the relationship and consider the parties 
as if they were legal spouses if certain functional attributes are met, such 
as the duration of cohabitation.100 Partial ascription is somewhat less 
problematic than pure ascription, as the recognition of rights or duties 
94. Aloni, supra note 91, at 1313.
95. Id. at 1314.
96. Kieran Tranter, Lyndal Sleep, & John Stannard, The Cohabitation Rule: Indetermina-
cy and Oppression in Australian Social Security Law, 32 MELB. U.L. REV. 698, 699 
(2008); Leckey, supra note 53, at 31. But see Aloni, supra note 91, at 1320.
97. Aloni, supra note 91, at 1321–22. For California, see ANN. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 11351.5 (Westlaw through Ch. 181 of 2018 Reg. Sess.). See also Russell v. 
Carleson, 111 Cal. Rptr. 497, 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (finding the foregoing law 
compatible with the constitution). The reason only three states have this rule, despite 
it being a federal program, is that each state defines the relevant “family unit” for 
purposes of the program.
98. See Garrison, supra note 88, at 296 (“Because cohabitation typically does not produce 
the same income-pooling benefits as marriage, a policy based on the assumption of 
income-pooling by cohabitants is counterfactual and might produce serious inequi-
ty.”).
99. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.3d 660, 664 (Cal. 1976).
100. Aloni, supra note 91, at 1313.
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has the potential to surprise just one member of a relationship, instead 
of both.101
Some excerpts from the factual background of the Canadian case 
Ross v. Reaney can be illuminating in this regard.102 Ross and Reaney 
were same-sex partners for 18 years, but lived apart for several years due 
to Reaney’s job.103
[2] Ross is now 46 years old and is self-employed for 
approximately 6 months a year as a personal trainer. His 
disclosed income is approximately $19,000.00 USD 
annually. . . .
[3] Reaney is 47 years old and is self-employed in 
Ontario as a consultant. His disclosed annual income is 
$126,000.00 [CAD].104
This background information reflects the economic asymmetry the 
couple experienced, which prompted Ross to seek financial support up-
on dissolution of the relationship.
[3] Ross alleges that the parties were in a committed same 
sex relationship for approximately 18 years. . . .
[4] Ross alleges that during the course of their 
relationship, the couple made joint decisions with respect to 
all aspects of their lives and shared their lives including joint 
participation in financial decisions, social life, and 
management of their domestic lives. Ross says that their 
relationship was sexually intimate. They vacationed together. 
They purchased property together. They maintained 
principal and other residences together and cared for each 
other during times of illness. They gave gifts to each other 
and celebrated holidays and special events together. They 
held themselves out as partners to their families and 
friends. . . .105
101. Id.
102. Ross v. Reaney, 2003 CanLII 1929 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
103. Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶ 3.
104. Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶¶ 1–3. The amount of the property is in USD as it was 
generated in Florida, where Mr. Ross, the claimant, worked.
105. Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶¶ 3–4 (emphasis added).
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The passage shows Ross’s attempt to support his claim for interim 
support.106 He emphasizes that the couple was in a “committed” 
relationship to trigger partial ascription of benefits.107
[6] Reaney denies that the parties were in a committed same 
sex relationship for 18 years. He claims that the relationship 
existed for 3 years from 1985 to 1988 at which time Reaney 
moved to Harvard to complete a 1-year Masters Program. In 
1988, Reaney learned that Ross was HIV positive which, 
according to Reaney, led to dramatic changes in the nature of 
their relationship . . . Reaney denies that they were sexually 
intimate after the diagnosis. . . .
[7] Reaney denies that there was any emotional 
commitment to Ross other than as friend. . . .108
Here, Reaney is acting pro domo sua (in his own interest). He as-
serts that the two were not in a committed relationship and that they 
were bound only by friendship.109
[9] . . . In December 1995, Reaney was paying Ross 
$3,000 per month. Between June 2002 and August 2002 
Reaney unilaterally reduced the payments to $1,500 per 
month. In August 2002, the payments were terminated. At 
this time Reaney was openly and ultimately involved with 
another partner. Ross says that this ended his relationship 
with Reaney.
[10] Ross alleges that Reaney began paying the salary 
after Ross began suffering from chronic fatigue. . . . The 
salary was a method of providing Reaney with a means of 
splitting income for income tax purposes.110
In order to gain an advantage in the lawsuit, each party reported the 
other’s fraudulent conduct, as when Reaney alluded to the income-
splitting technique,111 and even resorted to disclosing details of their 
sexual life.112 While Ross glorified their story of true love and firm 
106. Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶¶ 3–4 (emphasis added).
107. Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶¶ 3–4.
108. Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶¶ 6–7.
109. Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶¶ 6–7.
110. Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶¶ 9–10.
111. Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶¶ 9–10.
112. Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶¶ 6–8.
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commitment, Reaney referred to Ross as no more than a friend and 
rejected all of Ross’s factual claims.113
The important takeaway of the case is that ascription places a great 
burden on the members of a family who do not want the commitment. 
One should ask whether redistribution of property from Reaney to Ross 
is fair. Suppose that, for whatever reason, Reaney did not want to 
commit to a long-term partnership with Ross. He must therefore have 
chosen to either end their cohabitation prematurely or else to accept 
legal ascription. Reaney must also have refrained from transferring 
money to Ross, even if Reaney’s financial situation permitted it, even if 
Ross’s health was compromised, and even if Reaney would have liked to 
do so. It is hard to see how such a system could represent the best 
approach to supporting new families. 
Partial ascription also creates a barrier to the formation of new 
supportive networks. It often triggers an intrusive inquiry into partners’ 
lifestyles and sexual and emotional intimacy, as the Ross v. Reaney case 
shows.114 The same goes for non-conjugal partners. Professor Aloni 
points out that “[i]n the welfare context . . . having an unrelated adult 
in one’s apartment almost immediately invites questions from social 
workers and could easily deter people from living together.”115 This kind 
of public probing might impair the flourishing of new kinship unions in 
another respect: It could require people to define their relationship 
before they otherwise would wish to do so, and then effectively lock the 
parties into that definition. 
Under either approach, the cons outweigh the pros. Involuntary 
and compulsory recognition are more costly for new families than com-
plete unrecognition.116
C. Registration
Registration is a formal remedy through which parties gain a status, 
as well as rights and benefits attached to that status. Civil unions, 
designated beneficiary schemes, and domestic partnerships are all 
examples of the registration model. Like marriage, all such registration 
113. Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶ 7.
114. Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929.
115. Aloni, supra note 91, at 1329.
116. Id. at 1280 (“Largely missing from the celebration of recognition in the law of do-
mestic relations is the simple yet meaningful fact that legal recognition comes with a 
financial cost—sometimes an unjust cost.”).
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schemes trigger automatic legal consequences.117 And as with previous 
systems, such consequences might fall within the scope of private law, 
public law, or both. Registration-related rights, duties, and benefits 
might mirror those attached to marriage—or not.118
When registration schemes offer the same benefits as marriage (as 
with civil unions), they operate as functional equivalents to marriage. In 
such cases, it is a common drafting technique for legislators to simply 
add a line of text (such as “or civil unions”) to existing marriage-related 
statutes.119 But registration schemes can be a separate regime from mar-
riage altogether, and thereby attach a different package of legal conse-
quences.120 This segregated regime is achieved by creating a new set of 
rights, duties, and benefits, which are usually less extensive than those 
associated with marriage.121
Unlike a contractual arrangement, registration saves parties time 
and effort because it can be based on a regime of certain benefits and 
obligations being packaged together by default.122 But like the contrac-
tual model, it is a “formal” model for determining parties’ rights and 
duties.123 It is also respectful of personal autonomy in that it requires 
parties to take affirmative steps to publicly express their commitment 
and articulate their expectations, unlike functional regimes that ascribe a 
status regardless of the will of the parties.124
The chief critique of the registration model is that it is excessively 
rigid, particularly as far as public law benefits are concerned.125
Registration essentially confers a bundle of benefits to replicate those of 
117. See LAW COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 57, at 117.
118. See Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 591–94 (2013).
119. This is the case in Italy. Art. 20 LEGGE 20 MAGGIO 2016, n. 76 at ¶ 33. The law is 
entitled “Regolamentazione delle unioni civili tra persone dello stesso sesso e disci-
plina delle convivenze” [Rules concerning civil unions between same-sex partners and 
the legal framework of cohabitation]. Art. 20 LEGGE 20 MAGGIO 2016, n. 76.
120. Aloni, supra note 118, at 591–94.
121. See infra Figure 2 and Section II.B. This is also true for countries outside the purview 
of this Article. For instance, in Italy, same-sex and opposite-sex couples can enter a 
civil partnership through registration, which, notwithstanding a clause equating their 
status to that of married couples, does not confer a duty of fidelity, nor a right to 
adopt children. See also Art. 20 LEGGE 20 MAGGIO 2016, n. 76, “Regolamentazione 
delle unioni civili tra persone dello stesso sesso e disciplina delle convivenze” [Rules 
concerning civil unions between same-sex partners and the legal framework of cohab-
itation].
122. LAW COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 57, at 117.
123. See Leckey, supra note 53, at 12.
124. LAW COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 57, at 117.
125. See, e.g., Elizabeth Brake, Book Review, 30 PHIL. REV. 418, 420 (reviewing TAMARA 
METZ, UNTYING THE KNOT (2010)).
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marriage—the traditional means of allocating social goods. Critics note 
that registration schemes fail to account for all the possible forms that 
adult relationships might take.  
I argue that there are two forms of registration: (1) what I will call 
“registration by default,” where given benefits are automatically attached 
to the legal status, and (2) “registration by design,” where parties desig-
nate the beneficiaries of their benefits (with each benefit potentially con-
ferred upon different beneficiaries).126
1. Registration by Default
The most common form of a registration scheme is one where pre-
determined benefits are automatically attached to a given status.127 Ex-
amples of registration by default schemes in comparative perspective are 
many and range from domestic partnerships to civil unions.128 The most 
significant examples for purposes of the present Article are the reciprocal 
and designated beneficiary schemes in the U.S., as will be discussed in 
Section II.129 Registration by default schemes, in the most common 
form, are “comprehensive,” such that a range of benefits accrue to the 
parties. They can also be narrowly focused in the sense that the pre-
determined consequences of registration concern only the specific bene-
fits that a government agency administers.130
Many innovative proposals for protecting new kinship unions are 
comprehensive registration by default schemes. One example is the “in-
timate caregiving union” (“ICGU”) scheme proposed by Tamara 
126. The selected terminology echoes the privacy-by-default/privacy-by-design dichotomy, 
coined by the Canadian Privacy Commissioner of Ontario in the 1990s. It by no 
means intends to refer to the legal meaning acquired by these locutions in the field of 
privacy. It merely recalls its prima facie meaning, which seems applicable to registra-
tion models as well.
127. Leckey, supra note 53, at 12 (defining registration itself as a “legislatively established 
framework of rights and obligations that the parties to a relationship can take on.”).
128. See William N. Eskridge, Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, 
Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1935– 40 (2012). The trend 
of adding new options to the menu of relationships is widespread in Western legal 
systems. For European examples, see generally JENS M. SCHERPE, EUROPEAN FAMILY 
LAW VOLUME III: FAMILY LAW IN A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE (2016).
129. See infra Section II.A.
130. This system is in force in the Canadian province of Manitoba, and it allows non-
married conjugal couples to register with the government agency to gain a few marital 
benefits, such as property division rules. Family Property Act, C.C.S.M. c. F25 
(Can.).
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Metz.131 She suggests introducing a new legal framework in the U.S. 
whereby marriage is replaced with an ICGU status.132 The newly created 
status would remove the state from the ethically-driven choice of ex-
tending marriage and would instead recognize all intimate caregiving 
units.133 She also contends that marriage should be disestablished: 
Against suggestions that the state’s legitimate welfare 
concerns with respect to intimate associational life are best 
treated by reforming marriage or replacing it with a system of 
private contract, an intimate caregiving union status, 
narrowly and carefully tailored to recognize, protect, and 
support intimate caregiving in its many forms, would most 
effectively balance liberal commitments to liberty, equality, 
and stability.134
Metz’s account is premised on the assumption that recognition of 
caregiving units through status, as opposed to contract, is the only viable 
way to remedy social injustice and protect these unions. According to 
Metz, adult-adult intimate caregiving relationships need “the special 
recognition and protection that only a status can afford.”135 For Metz, 
defining what constitutes a “caregiving” union and what benefits will 
accrue to them are questions that remain open.136
2. Registration by Design
The chief critique of the registration by default model is that it is 
excessively rigid, particularly as far as public law benefits are concerned. 
This registration essentially confers a bundle of benefits to replicate the 
traditional means of allocating social goods through marriage. 
Registration by design differs from registration by default in that parties 
can, after registering their relationship, freely choose the beneficiary (or 
131. Professor Metz provides a lucid account of acceptable goals vis-à-vis marriage within 
the context of a liberal state. Provided that the state cannot perform duties as an ethi-
cal authority, it must limit its action to promote social goals not driven by ethics, 
such as public health. In order to limit the ethical role of states in this field, the pre-
ferred option is that of separating marriage from the state. See METZ, supra note 22, 
at 14.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 140.
136. See generally METZ, supra note 22.
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beneficiaries) upon whom they wish to confer benefits. Each benefit 
need not be assigned to the same beneficiary. Put differently, parties can 
“customize” the allocation of their subsidies and designate different 
beneficiaries. In this way, the registration by design scheme prizes 
personal autonomy. 
But a registration by design system creates additional administra-
tive burdens because there are no default rules, as with marriage and reg-
istration by default. Accordingly, the system does not excel in clarity or 
simplicity, as evinced by the following two examples. 
In her piece “Friends with Benefits,” Professor Laura A. Rosenbury 
analyzes the way people provide care outside of the home, particularly 
among friends.137 She starts from the fundamental premise that people 
can perform multiple caregiving functions over time, and that fluidity is 
inherent in family formations (other than marital or marital-like rela-
tionships).138 In order to protect and reflect these shifting networks of 
reciprocal care, she argues, family law has to introduce a mechanism 
that permits a person to assign some of the benefits traditionally at-
tached to marriage to individuals of their choice.139 For example, a per-
son could decide that she wanted her health insurance benefits to be 
shared with a sibling, her family and medical leave be given to a grand-
mother, and that hospital visitation rights be assigned to a dear friend.140
The main benefit of such an approach is that there need not be a 
comprehensive bundle of benefits and obligations that parties must ac-
cept as such and then allocate to only one partner.141 Rosenbury also re-
quires that the allocation of the benefit(s) be done on a mutual basis, 
such that one receives caregiving benefits only as long as he or she ac-
cepts caregiving responsibilities.142 This clearly makes the system more 
workable.
The benefits of self-designation are undoubted from an autonomy 
perspective. A registration by design (or similar system allowing for mul-
tiple, symmetrical designations that do not come in the form of registra-
tion) would be beneficial to the flourishing of queer formations that are 
nomadic and can hardly find legal categories to reflect their complexi-
137. Rosenbury, supra note 60.
138. Id. at 229.
139. Id. at 230–31.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 231. A proposal from Steve Sugarman concerning the Short Term Paid Leave 
plan in the employment context echoes a similar approach. See Stephen D. Sugar-
man, Short Term Paid Leave: A New Approach to Social Insurance and Employee Bene-
fits, 75 CAL. L. REV. 465, 466–73 (1987).
142. Rosenbury, supra note 60, at 232.
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ty.143 A flexible model like Rosenbury’s would allow parties in more 
atypical arrangements to think of themselves as a “family,” as opposed 
to thinking of their relationship as a mere happenstance. Legal scholar-
ship has long acknowledged the dynamic interplay between social facts 
and legal categories.144 This type of model would provide parties to 
queer assemblies with more malleable concepts to frame their relation-
ships. Furthermore, in allowing for multiple beneficiaries, registration 
by design schemes effectively eliminate legal definitions of “family,” as 
long as they are no longer necessary for conferring rights.145 In this 
sense, the system reduces the risk of assimilation inherent in legal defini-
tions.146
Professor Aloni has a similar proposal, which he calls “registered 
contractual relationships” (“RCRs”).147 Professor Aloni believes that fu-
ture information technology will facilitate the introduction of a system 
with multiple legal designations because it will enhance the govern-
ment’s ability to check who has been designated and for what purpose,
thereby overcoming the main shortcoming of designation by design sys-
tems: their administrability.148
Professor Rosenbury and Professor Aloni both leave open questions
about designing a workable proposal. How should beneficiaries be des-
ignated? How could someone designate different beneficiaries for differ-
ent benefits? How could the government check which person has been 
designated as the beneficiary of a specific benefit? Should parties still be 
allowed to have multiple beneficiaries for the same benefit; if so, to what 
extent?149 While viable for non-costly benefits, such as hospital visita-
tion, major concerns could surely be raised for costly programs, such as 
143. See Frederik Swennen & Mariano Croce, Family (Law) Assemblages: New Modes of 
Being (Legal), 44 J. OF L. & SOC’Y 532 (2017).
144. Id. at 556.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Swennen & Croce, supra note 49; Lauren Berlant & Micheal Warner, Sex in 
Public, in QUEER STUDIES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 170 (Robert J. Corber & 
Stephen Valocchi eds., 2003); Stacey Young, Dichotomy and Displacement: Bisexuality 
in Queer Theory and Politics, in PLAYING WITH FIRE: QUEER POLITICS, QUEER 
THEORIES (Shane Phelan ed., 1997).
147. Notwithstanding the proposal’s alleged “contractual” nature, Professor Aloni refers to 
the possibility of registering based either on a contract or on a form prearranged by 
the administration. Aloni, supra note 118, at 608.
148. Id. at 608–09.
149. I believe that the main objection to polygamy is that there are financial constraints 
that prevent the possibility of conferring the same benefit to several people. Giving 
different benefits to different people, as long as you give them just to one person at a 
time, is a different situation which does not implicate this problem.
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survivor pensions or health care benefits. These practicalities advise 
against considering this option at present.
I believe that the registration by design model is underdeveloped in 
its answers to these questions. While the model is appealing for its em-
phasis on flexibility and personal autonomy, it requires further research. 
3. A tertium genus?
If one thinks of registration by default and registration by design as 
two Manichean opposites, it makes sense to inquire into whether a third 
option exists within the macro-category “registration.” Indeed, I suggest 
thinking of the registration by default and registration by design models 
as the two extremes of a continuum. An ideal system could be some-
where in the middle—for example, a system with default rules that are 
supplemented by a robust opt-out regime. Such a system could allow 
parties to choose which benefits to confer but restrict the designation to 
only one beneficiary. This system, despite being closer to a registration 
by default model, shares some valuable characteristics of registration by 
design models, especially the flexibility of the assigned benefits.
This middle-ground option was implemented in the Designated 
Beneficiary Act in Colorado150 that I discuss further below.151 While the 
Designated Beneficiary Act does not allow two parties to designate mul-
tiple beneficiaries, it does allow them to tailor the partnership agreement 
by choosing which benefits to confer upon their beneficiary.152 This in-
termediate category strikes a reasonable balance between flexibility and 
administrability.
D. Mixed Systems
Another way to recognize aspiring family units is to merge two 
general models into a hybrid one. This section will first address a 
system, developed in legal scholarship, that is based on registration and 
transformative redistribution through ascription. It will then briefly 
150. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105 (Westlaw through 2018, 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st 
Gen. Assemb.).
151. See infra Section II.A.
152. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105 (3) (Westlaw through 2018, 2d Reg. Sess. of 
71st Gen. Assemb.) (“A designated beneficiary agreement shall entitle the parties to 
exercise the following rights . . . unless specifically excluded from the designated 
beneficiary agreement . . . .”).
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discuss the scheme currently in force in Alberta, Canada, which is also
based on a hybrid of registration and ascription.153 Both systems adopt a 
formal and a functional approach to legal recognition.
Professor Polikoff developed the first proposal for providing bene-
fits to new families, and it draws on both registration and redistribution 
through ascription. Like Professor Rosenbury,154 Polikoff asserts that 
people who want to formalize their relationship must be able to do so 
outside the narrow boundaries of marriage and conjugality.155 Under 
Polikoff’s “valuing all families” approach, someone without a spouse or 
domestic partner could still register for benefits and indicate a “desig-
nated family member” to be the recipient.156 Her registration scheme,
however, does not confer onto new families the same rights, obligations, 
and benefits that flow from marriage.157 Polikoff identifies Vermont’s 
law protecting “reciprocal beneficiaries”—a scheme that will be consid-
ered in depth in Section II.A.2.—as the one that most resembles her ap-
proach. Accordingly, for Polikoff and under the Vermont statute, regis-
tration benefits would be limited to health-related rights and abuse 
prevention.158
Polikoff’s proposal differs from the Vermont regime in a several
ways. First, the Vermont law limited eligible beneficiaries to blood rela-
tives, but Polikoff has proposed expanding that to allow a person to des-
ignate a non-relative beneficiary.159 Second, unlike the Vermont law, 
Polikoff has added that when someone dies intestate, his beneficiary 
could inherit his estate, just the same as if the person were a spouse.160 If 
a person dies without having designated a family member, Polikoff ar-
gues that the government should investigate which beneficiary the per-
son would have designated, had he envisaged the possibility of doing 
so.161 This is a positive, rather than deprivative, example of pure ascrip-
tion. Finally, Polikoff argues that wrongful death statutes should be 
based on the beneficiary’s actual dependency on the deceased worker.162
153. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A–4.5 (Can.).
154. Rosenbury, supra note 60.
155. POLIKOFF, supra note 5, at 126.
156. Id. at 134–35.
157. Id.
158. See 15 VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 1301–1306 (Westlaw, repealed 2013, Adj. Sess. No, 164).
159. POLIKOFF, supra note 5, at 135; see also 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1301 (Westlaw, re-
pealed 2013, Adj. Sess. No, 164).
160. Id. at 134–35.
161. Id. at 135–36.
162. See POLIKOFF, supra note 5, at 195. Proof of dependency refers to the need to provide 
proof that the claimant was financially dependent upon the deceased worker. It thus 
differs from the presumption of dependency that often attaches to spouses and chil-
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Polikoff asserts that under a “valuing-all-families” approach, all possible 
family members (including parties to non-normative families) could 
show dependency.163
A second example of a hybrid system comes from a law in Alberta, 
Canada, called the Adult Interdependent Relationships Act (AIRA).164
The system is a mixed one based on both a contractual and ascriptive 
model. It will be further analyzed in Section II. In brief, AIRA sets forth 
two different models for recognition. Parties can either sign a written 
agreement (contractual model),165 or they can acquire legal status as a 
family if they either: (1) live in a three year-long interdependent rela-
tionship; or (2) are in a relationship “of some permanence,” while rais-
ing a child (ascription).166 AIRA is more limited than Polikoff’s proposal 
in that under Section (3)(2) of AIRA, persons related to each other by 
blood or adoption are not eligible for ascription and may only become 
adult interdependent partners by entering into a written agreement.167
Under AIRA, close friends and roommates who meet the eligibility cri-
teria can have legal status ascribed.168 As discussed previously, the down-
side of ascription is the limitation on personal freedom to decide wheth-
er to formalize a relationship.169
Section II
Legal Initiatives
The distinction between “philosophically-driven” and “politically-
driven” legal initiatives has special significance in the field of marriage
dren in such statutes, including the California statute (Cal. Civ. Proc. C. § 377.60 
(b),(c) (2007)).
163. POLIKOFF, supra note 5, at 5.
164. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A-4.5 (Can.).
165. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A-4.5, § 3(1)(b) (Can.).
166. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A-4.5, § 3(1)(a) (Can.).
167. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A-4.5, § 3(2) (Can.). Since 
these partnerships are formalized through a private contract, there are no statistics on 
the number of contracted AIPs since the enactment of the law.
168. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A-4.5, § 3(1)(a) (Can.)
169. The Consultation Report on the law voiced concerns that an ascriptive system apply-
ing across the board would impinge on the freedom of choice of two cohabiting rela-
tives or friends unwilling to make a long-term commitment. Anu Nijhawan, Alberta’s
New Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, 22 EST. TR. & PENSIONS J. 157, 171 
(2003). However, contrary to the recommendations of the Consultation Report on 
the reform, Section (3)(2) of AIRA, setting out a duty to enter an agreement to be-
come an AIP, only concerns relatives. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 
2002, c A-4.5, § 3(2) (Can.).
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and status recognition. “Philosophically-driven” initiatives are essentially 
political movements grounded in progressive concerns that have
emerged in socio-legal or political scholarship.170 By contrast, 
“politically-driven” laws are developed primarily by conservative 
politicians who aim to preserve the status quo.171 The legal initiatives 
examined below are politically-driven, with the exception of the scheme 
in Colorado, which was pushed forward by progressive social groups.172
Conservative groups who wanted to shift the public’s focus away 
from the LGBT marriage equality struggle began to enact laws like those 
below in 1997.173 They range from bills inspired by outright homopho-
bia (as in the cases of Alberta, Canada; Alabama; and Missouri) to initia-
tives that simply diluted protection for same-sex couples by offering the
protections through a wider, and thus more ideologically neutral, regis-
tration scheme (as in Hawaii and Vermont).174 Subsection A will explore 
the reciprocal and designated beneficiary schemes in the United States. 
Subsection B will be devoted to Canada, and particularly to the scheme 
in force in Alberta. Subsection C will deal specifically with the conserva-
tive bills in Alabama and Missouri that lay out an original variation of 
the contractual model, featuring publicly-binding contracts.
A. Designated and Reciprocal Beneficiary Schemes in the U.S.
As discussed above, designated and reciprocal beneficiary schemes 
are registration schemes for consenting adults who meet certain eligibil-
ity criteria. The difference between designated and reciprocal beneficiary
schemes mainly consists in the former being “tailor-made” (i.e. giving 
the parties the opportunity to choose which benefits to confer upon 
each other) and the latter conferring a definite set of rights.175
As for the scope of eligibility, the parties that can take advantage of 
the scheme vary from state to state. In some states (like Vermont and 
170. Nicholas Bala, Controversy over Couples in Canada: The Evolution of Marriage and 
Other Adult Interdependent Relationships, QUEEN’S L.J. 41, 88–89 (2003); see also
COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW: LAW AND THE MARRIAGE
CRISIS IN NORTH AMERICA 27 (2005).
171. Nicholas Bala, supra note 170, at 88–89; see also COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 
170, at 27.
172. The scheme constitutes the most flexible and comprehensive scheme enacted so far to 
protect non-normative unions. It’s been included in the analysis for that reason de-
spite being promoted by LGBT groups, not conservative groups.
173. POLIKOFF, supra note 5, at 69–72.
174. See infra Section I.A.
175. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW, 281 (4th ed. 2015).
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Hawaii) the scheme reaches only couples who are legally unable to mar-
ry;176 in others (Colorado and Washington, D.C.) the scheme reaches all 
sorts of non-normative relationships, including blood relatives; others 
still (Maine and Maryland) split the difference, allowing access to a 
number of relationships, but denying it to blood relatives, such as sib-
lings.177
Figure 1. Families Eligible to Enter into Designated/Reciprocal 
Beneficiary Schemes
Same-sex 
couples
Other 
unmarried 
conjugal 
partners
Relatives Friends Eligibility
Colorado x x x x
Any two unmarried, consenting adults of 
sound mind
Hawaii x* x Any two adults unable to marry
Vermont x
Any two people unable to marry (or enter 
a civil union) and related by blood or by 
adoption
Maine x x x
Any two individuals except within some 
specified degrees of consanguinity
Maryland x x x
Two cohabiting individuals of any gender 
in a mutually caring relationship
D.C. x x x x
Any two unmarried individuals in a 
committed relationship
* Before the introduction of same-sex marriage in the Hawaii Marriage Equality Act.178
As to the material scope of the laws, they can range from very nar-
row (a law that confers on family members only the right to make 
health-related decisions)179 to very broad (laws which give non-
traditional families near-comprehensive protection under both private 
and public law).180 As shown in Figure 2, new families have not been 
equated with married families under any of these schemes: They can on-
ly access some private law entitlements or public law benefits through 
each scheme.181
176. See infra Figure 1.
177. Id.
178. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (Westlaw through 2013 Act 4 2d Spec. Sess.).
179. See, e.g., 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1301(a), (b) (Westlaw, repealed 2013, Adj. Sess.  No, 
164).
180. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(3)(c) (Westlaw through 2018, 2d Reg. 
Sess. of 71st Gen. Assemb.).
181. See infra Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Material Scope of Designated/Reciprocal Beneficiary 
Schemes for New Families
Social 
security, 
welfare, or tax 
benefits
Workers’ 
compensation
Health-
related rights
Intestate 
rights
Property 
rights
Wrongful 
death 
compensation
Other
Colorado x* x x x x x
Hawaii x** x x x
Family and 
funeral leave, 
miscellaneous 
provisions 
Maine x x
Maryland x*** x
D.C. x
Family and 
funeral leave
Vermont 
[repealed]
x Abuse prevention
* Colorado only gives pensions to public employees, or private employees if the employer 
elects to do so. C.R.S. 15-22-105(3)(c).
** Only visitation rights.
*** Tax exemption for property transfers.
1. Hawaii 
The Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr v. Lewin (1993)
was the first time a U.S. court ruled that excluding same-sex couples 
from marriage was unconstitutional.182 The case was then remanded to 
the trial court to determine whether the state action passed muster un-
der strict scrutiny, and the Court found it did not.183 Pending the appeal 
of that decision, Hawaii voters passed a referendum that amended the 
state constitution to restrict the definition of marriage to opposite-sex 
spouses.184 That litigation was a catalyst for the enactment of Hawaii’s 
182. Dee Ann Habegger, Living in Sin and the Law: Benefits for Unmarried Couples De-
pendent on Sexual Orientation?, 33 IND. L. REV. 1000 (2000) (discussing Baehr); see
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
183. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-CV-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21–22 (Haw. Ct. App. 
Dec. 3, 1996).
184. HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
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Reciprocal Beneficiary Act of 1997.185 The law was passed as a conces-
sion to conservatives, who hoped that the introduction of a neutral 
scheme open to a wider array of couples would satisfy the complaints of 
same-sex couples.186
Hawaii’s law allows any two individuals (who cannot enter into a 
valid legal marriage) to designate each other as “reciprocal beneficiaries,”
and thus receive some benefits usually attached exclusively to mar-
riage.187 The law was meant to apply to couples unable to marry, namely 
relatives and same-sex couples.188 By registering with the Department of 
Health through a simple form, parties can access a number of benefits 
which are typically only enjoyed by married couples, including:
(1) Legal standing to sue for wrongful death and under 
domestic violence statutes;
(2) Property and inheritance rights;
(3) Hospital visitation rights;
(4) Family and funeral leave; and
(5) Miscellaneous benefits under state law, such as 
government vehicle emergency use, use of the facilities of the 
University of Hawaii, etc.189
Not only does this scheme include insurance benefits and health 
decision-making rights, but it also lists other spousal-like unitive bene-
fits,190 such as some limited property rights191 and rights under succes-
sion law (including the right to an elective share upon death).192 The 
family health insurance benefits (both private and public) and the right 
185. Ian Curry-Sumner & Scott Curry-Sumner, Is the Union Civil? Same-sex Marriages, 
Civil Unions, Domestic Partnerships & Reciprocal Benefits in the USA, 4 UTRECHT L.
REV. 236, 243 (2008).
186. Id. at 243; Eskridge, supra note 128, at 1938.
187. Hawaii Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, Laws 1997, ch. 383, § 1 (codified in part in
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C) (Westlaw through 2018 Act 220).
188. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-4 (Westlaw through 2018 Act 220) (listing the req-
uisites of a valid reciprocal beneficiary relationship); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 572C-2
(Westlaw through 2018 Act 220) (explaining that non-marital relationships, such as a 
widowed mother and son, can now receive rights and benefits).
189. H.B. 118, 119th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1997).
190. Eskridge, supra note 128, at 1910 (defining unitive rules as rules that enforce the as-
sumption that the parties in a marriage act as a unit as opposed to separate persons).
191. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §509-2 (Westlaw through 2018 Act 220). Property rights 
include benefits and obligations related to jointly held property, but do not include 
distribution of property or support upon breakdown of the relationship.
192. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §560:2-202 (elective share), §560:2-301 (entitlement of 
spouse), §560: 2-802, §560:2-804 (Westlaw through 2018 Act 220).
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to workers’ compensation benefits to reciprocal beneficiaries were the 
least favorable to employers.193
This ambitious scheme was curtailed almost immediately after its 
enactment by Hawaii’s Attorney General (who interpreted the worker 
medical insurance provision as only applicable to insurance companies, 
although the majority of employees are not insured through these com-
panies),194 the state legislature (who refused to fund the medical insur-
ance program) and the courts (who deemed some state private sector
benefit plans preempted).195 As a result, the law’s most groundbreaking 
provisions were almost immediately rendered inapplicable to many of its 
intended beneficiaries.196
2. Vermont 
The Vermont reciprocal beneficiaries scheme, which was repealed 
in 2013,197 applied to any two people who were unable to marry (or en-
ter into a civil union) and were related by blood or adoption.198 The 
scheme was more limited in scope than Hawaii’s.199 It did not include 
intestate succession or legal standing to sue for wrongful death.200 Like-
wise, social or tax benefits were not included in the scheme.201 It also ex-
pressly prevented courts from construing the statute in such a way as “to 
create any spousal benefits, protections or responsibilities for reciprocal 
193. Catherine L. Fisk, ERISA Preemption of State and Local Laws on Domestic Partnership 
and Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Employment, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 267, 
at 271 (1998).
194. Hawaii Attorney General, Legal Opinion Letter 97-05 (Aug. 14, 1997) (available at 
https://ag.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/97-05.pdf); Hawaii Attorney 
General, Legal Opinion Letter 97-10 (Dec. 2, 1997) (available at https://
ag.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/97-10.pdf); Curry-Sumner & Curry-
Sumner, supra note 185, at 244.
195. Fisk, supra note 193, at 271.
196. Id.
197. 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1301(a)(Westlaw, repealed 2013, Adj. Sess.  No, 164).
198. 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1301 (Westlaw, repealed 2013, Adj. Sess.  No, 164).
199. See supra Figure 2; see also Martha M. Ertman, The Ali Principles’ Approach to Domes-
tic Partnership, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 107, 110 n.10 (2001).
200. See id.
201. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Vermont explained in Embree v. Balfanz that the 
reciprocal beneficiary is a “family,” not merely a household member for purposes of 
the applicability of the Vermont’s Abuse Prevention Statute. This shows a gradual 
judicial evolution on the notion of family. See 817 A.2d 6, 9 (2002).
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beneficiaries not specifically enumerated herein.”202 Upon registration, 
two persons were entitled to the following:
(1) Hospital visitation and medical decision-making rights;
(2) Decision-making rights relating to anatomical gifts;
(3) Decision-making rights relating to disposition of remains;
(4) Patient’s bill of rights, which conferred the right to be 
informed of a loved one’s diagnosis and prognosis, as well as 
visitation rights;
(5) Nursing home patient’s bill of rights, which recognized 
the right to privacy during visits; and
(6) Access to the state domestic abuse prevention program 
and connected reliefs.203
The genesis of the Act differed from Hawaii’s Reciprocal Benefi-
ciary Act. In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that the exclu-
sion of same-sex couples from the “statutory benefits, protections, and 
security incident to marriage” infringed the equal protection clause of 
the Vermont Constitution, but the court left the appropriate remedy to 
the discretion of the legislature.204 The government eventually opted for 
civil unions, restricted to same-sex couples, in an attempt to preserve the 
purity of marriage.205 The legislature also added another layer of protec-
tion to confer minimal rights to “residual unions”—those unmarried 
non-gay couples—as “a polite gesture to conservatives.”206 The aim was 
to reduce the symbolism of recognizing same-sex couples through civil 
unions.207
In the context of reciprocal beneficiary schemes, the Vermont law 
stands out because it was limited only to health-related choices and pro-
tection against domestic violence.208 In any case, the statute did not 
202. 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1301(b) (Westlaw, repealed 2013, Adj. Sess.  No, 164).
203. 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1301 (Westlaw, repealed 2013, Adj. Sess.  No, 164). The list 
does not include advanced directives for health care and end of life. 18 VT. STAT.
ANN. §§ 5263–5278 (Westlaw, repealed 2005, No. 55, § 9).
204. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886–89 (1999).
205. Thomas F. Coleman, Reciprocal Beneficiary Laws Mask a Larger Political Battle,
UNMARRIED AMERICA (Mar. 13, 2006), http://www.unmarriedamerica.org/column-
one/3-13-06-reciprocal-beneficiaries.htm.
206. Id. (“Because they had a judicial gun to their heads, moderate legislators felt com-
pelled to vote in favor of the comprehensive domestic partnership law, which they 
renamed ‘civil union.’ The ‘reciprocal beneficiary’ bill also passed as a polite gesture 
to conservatives.”).
207. Id.
208. See 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1301 (Westlaw, repealed 2013, Adj. Sess.  No, 164).
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prove to be very popular, and few people benefitted from it before its 
repeal.209
3. Useful Exceptions: Colorado, Maryland, Maine, and 
Washington, D.C.
This Article contends that new families should form alliances with 
conservative groups to advance their rights, since conservatives are often 
behind the introduction of alternative regimes to marriage.210 The fol-
lowing examples are schemes that did not originate from conservative 
fringes, yet are worth mentioning as valuable examples of models for 
protecting new families. 
Colorado’s Designated Beneficiary Act of 2009 (“DBA”) confers 
on any two unmarried people important protections in estate- and 
health-related decisions, 211 as well as public law benefits.212 Pursuant to 
the law, a person can be named a “designated beneficiary” by an agree-
ment known as a Designated Beneficiary Agreement, or DBA.213 Unlike 
Hawaii’s statute, where the parties must be legally unable to enter a val-
id marriage in order to register, Colorado has no such restriction.214 The 
law only requires that the two parties be consenting adults of sound 
mind (i.e., legally competent to enter a valid contract).215 Although the 
scheme has been viewed as an estate-planning tool for intimate (oppo-
site-sex or same-sex) couples who have decided to not marry or enter a 
civil union, its reach is much broader: the agreement can be entered into 
by two unmarried friends or with any relative, including an adult 
child.216
Unlike the schemes in Hawaii and Vermont, the reform in Colora-
do constituted a stepping stone to enhancing protections for same-sex 
209. Aloni, supra note 118, at 592–93.
210. See supra Introduction.
211. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(1)(a), (c), (d) (Westlaw 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st 
Gen. Assemb.).
212. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(3)(c) (Westlaw 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st Gen. As-
semb.).
213. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(1) (Westlaw 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st Gen. As-
semb.).
214. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(1) (Westlaw 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st Gen. As-
semb.).
215. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(1) (Westlaw 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st Gen. As-
semb.).
216. See John G. Culhane, After Marriage Equality, What’s Next for Relationship Recogni-
tion?, 60 S.D. L. REV. 375, 384–85 (2015).
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couples, and the LGBT state advocacy group Equal Rights Colorado 
urged its introduction.217 Its protections are relatively cheap and easy to 
access, as parties can enter into a DBA by completing one easy form that 
does not require the assistance of an attorney.218 Upon designation, the 
parties to a DBA can exercise some rights and be entitled to some mar-
riage-like protections, as specified in the agreement.219 The scheme is al-
so highly flexible: parties can tailor it to their needs and expectations 
and confer benefits or privileges without a duty of reciprocity to each 
other.220
The DBA’s default regime—the array of protections that automati-
cally attach to designated beneficiaries—is also the broadest of any cur-
rent scheme.221 The Colorado law offers legal protections in both private 
217. Nancy D. Polikoff, Colorado Designated Beneficiary, in THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LGBTQ STUDIES 245 (Abbie E. Goldberg ed., 2016).
218. See John G. Culhane, After Marriage Equality, What’s Next for Relationship Recogni-
tion?, 60 S.D. L. REV. 375, 385 (2015).
219. A sample beneficiary agreement can be found on the website of the City and County 
of Denver. See CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, https://www.denvergov.org/content/
dam/denvergov/Portals/777/documents/MarriageCivilUnions/Designated
%20Beneficiary%20Agreement.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2018). It should be noted 
that the DBA can be superseded by any other valid document concerning the specific 
right/entitlement: “This designated beneficiary agreement is operative in the absence 
of other estate planning documents and will be superseded and set aside to the extent 
it conflicts with valid instruments such as a will, power of attorney, or beneficiary 
designation on an insurance policy or pension plan.” Id. This aspect brings it much 
closer to a contractual model for recognition.
220. Id.
221. Unless otherwise provided, pursuant to the Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-22-105(3), the 
DBA conveys the following: (1) “The right to acquire, hold title to, own jointly, or 
transfer inter vivos or at death real or personal property,” COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15-22-105(3)(b) (Westlaw through 2018, 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st Gen. Assemb.); (2) 
the right to receive “(I) Public employees’ retirement systems pursuant to articles 51 
to 54.6 of title 24, C.R.S.; (II) Local government firefighter and police pensions; 
(III) Insurance policies for life insurance coverage; and (IV) Health insurance policies 
or health coverage if the employer of the designated beneficiary elects to provide cov-
erage for designated beneficiaries as dependents,” COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-
105(3)(c) (Westlaw through 2018, 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st Gen. Assemb.); (3) The right 
to visitation by the other designated beneficiary in a hospital, nursing home, hospice, 
or similar health care facility, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(3)(e) (Westlaw 
through 2018, 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st Gen. Assemb.); (4) The right to act as a proxy 
decision-maker or surrogate decision-maker to make medical treatment decisions, as 
well as to act as a legal guardian, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(3)(f)
(Westlaw through 2018, 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st Gen. Assemb.); (5) The right to inherit 
real or personal property through intestate succession, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-
22-105(3)(i) (Westlaw through 2018, 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st Gen. Assemb.); (6) The 
right to receive benefits pursuant to the “Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado,”
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(3)(j) (Westlaw through 2018, 2d Reg. Sess. of 
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and public law.222 Not only does it include health-related decisions and 
hospital visitation rights, as in Vermont, but the Act also covers intestate 
prerogatives, property rights, workers’ compensation benefits, wrongful 
death compensation, and a specified list of public benefits, including 
health coverage and possible retirement benefits for public employees.223
Maryland, Maine, and Washington, D.C. have enacted statutes on 
“domestic partnerships” that can also be considered reciprocal benefi-
ciary schemes.224 In Maryland, two cohabiting individuals of any gender 
who are in a mutually caring relationship can register for benefits.225 The 
couple’s interdependence is defined under the law by economic interde-
pendence,226 which can be shown through a variety of evidence, such as 
a joint bank account statement or a property deed.227
Unlike Colorado and Hawaii, Maryland’s law prevents individuals 
who are related to each other by blood or marriage, within four degrees 
of consanguinity, from registering: It thus extends to a non-conjugal 
two-person friendship, but not to a family made up of two relatives or 
siblings.228 The statute confers a limited set of rights, including hospital 
visitation rights, funeral and burial decisions, and tax exemptions upon 
property transfer.229
71st Gen. Assemb.); (7) The right to have standing to sue for wrongful death on be-
half of the other designated beneficiary, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(3)(k) 
(Westlaw through 2018, 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st Gen. Assemb.).
222. See supra Figure 2.
223. Id.
224. S.785, 2009 Leg., 426th Sess. (Md. 2009); 18-A ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-910 
(Westlaw though 2017); D.C. CODE § 32–701 (Westlaw through Oct. 11, 2018). 
Wisconsin had a similar statute, but has shelved it since the Obergefell decision guar-
anteed the right of same-sex marriage. Obergefell chronicles the genealogy of these 
schemes to provide an alternative to same-sex marriage. With the passage of the Wis-
consin 2017-2019 biennial budget, WIS. STAT. § 66.0510 was introduced, prevent-
ing all municipalities, counties, and school districts from “offering employee benefit 
plan coverage to domestic partners of employees as of January 1, 2018.” See Wisconsin 
Budget Imposes Changes to Domestic Partner Coverage, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
CORPORATION (Oct. 10, 2017), http://www.ebcflex.com/Education/Compliance
Buzz/tabid/1140/ArticleID/528/Wisconsin-Budget-Imposes-Changes-to-Domestic-
Partner-Coverage-January-1-2018.aspx.
225. MD CODE ANN., HEALTH § 6-101(a)(Westlaw through 2018 Regular Sess.) (“two 
individuals who . . . (4) Agree to be in a relationship of mutual interdependence in 
which each individual contributes to the maintenance and support of the other indi-
vidual and the relationship.”).
226. MD CODE ANN., HEALTH § 6-101(a)(Westlaw through 2018 Regular Sess.).
227. MD CODE ANN., HEALTH § 6-101(b)(2)(Westlaw through 2018 Regular Sess.).
228. MD CODE ANN., HEALTH § 6-101(a)(2) (Westlaw through 2018 Regular Sess.).
229. S. 785, 2009 Gen. Assemb., 426th Sess. (Md. 2009).
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In a similar vein, Maine’s domestic partnership law allows any two 
individuals to register but maintains existing statutory prohibitions on 
polygamy and partnership between two people within specified degrees 
of consanguinity.230 The statute grants only some prerogatives in case 
of death of the partner, namely rights of inheritance231 and decision-
making about the disposal of human remains.232
Finally, D.C.’s domestic partnership regime is open to any two 
unmarried individuals in a committed relationship and extends to non-
romantic relationships.233 This broader reach (relative to marriage) was 
stressed by the D.C. Committee on the Judiciary in response to at-
tempts to repeal the scheme.234 The status confers limited rights, espe-
cially health-related rights and privileges, such as visitation rights,235 the 
right for D.C. government employees to request funeral and family 
leave,236 and the right to opt for self-financed family health insurance 
coverage.237
4. Summary 
All of the described schemes would offer legal protections for new 
families. Colorado’s DBA offers the best protections due to its broad 
application and the wide array of benefits it confers. Laudably, all of the 
schemes seem to shift the focus away from romantic, sexual relationships 
in that they do not list fidelity duties. Instead they tend to offer a set of 
rights centered on health-related decision-making and succession.238 But 
since they rarely include social security or tax benefits, the schemes stop 
short of fully addressing the problem of redistributive justice that is pos-
sible through government programs and only partially protect new fami-
lies.239
230. See H.B. 1152, 2004 121st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Me. 2004), citing to 19-A ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 701.2 (Westlaw though 2017).
231. See 18-A ME. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-102, 5-311(b)(2-A) (Westlaw though 2017).
232. 18-A REV. ME. STAT. ANN. § 2843-A(5) (Westlaw through 2017).
233. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 32–701 to 710(4) (Westlaw through July 27, 2018).
234. See Letter from Phil Mendelson, Councilmember, Comm. on Pub. Safety & the Ju-
diciary, to All Councilmembers (Nov. 10, 2009) (http://www.glaa.org/archive/2009/
b18-482committeereport1110.pdf).
235. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-704.
236. See generally D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-705.
237. See generally D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-706.
238. See supra Figure 2.
239. Leckey, supra note 53, at 3.
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Many of these schemes include benefits that are free, such as medi-
cal decision-making prerogatives or visitation rights.240 By contrast, only 
half the schemes examined above also offer rights under private law, 
such as intra-familial transfer of property.241 Because this benefit costs 
the state a loss in tax revenue (and thus is not free), it is a bolder reform.
The need to recognize public law benefits, in addition to the foregoing,
looms large in this analysis and will be a decisive factor in assessing fu-
ture policies. The tendency in current schemes is not to include direct 
outlays to subsidize new family networks through social security, wel-
fare, and tax benefits, but the path forward will need to include these in 
order to offer all families equal status. 
B. The Adult Interdependent Relationships Act of Alberta 
In 2002, Alberta introduced a new legal status for couples through 
the Adult Interdependent Relationships Act (“AIRA”).242 The status—as 
“adult interdependent partners” or “AIPs”—can be conferred either by 
contractual agreement or ascription, and is open to any two adults in an 
interdependent relationship.243 AIRA confers on new families many of 
the rights, obligations, and benefits of marriage.244 The phrase “adult in-
terdependent partners” (AIPs) is now added to many Canadian laws and 
provincial programs, and it continues to offer these couples benefits—
both public and private—that were previously reserved to spouses.245
In the public sphere, AIPs receive the same extended health care 
benefits as married couples, where one partner’s age is above 65 years 
old.246 Under the Alberta Workers Compensation Act, compensation 
following the death of a worker is owed to AIPs as well as spouses.247 In 
the private law sphere, AIPs are given the right to inherit property from 
240. See supra Figure 2 (showing that all schemes check the box of health-related rights, 
although Hawaii only allows hospital visitation rights).
241. Id.
242. See generally Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c. A-4.5 (Can.).
243. Id.
244. See ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, supra note 36, at ¶ 186.
245. Id. (“More than 130 different Alberta statutes and regulations now include the words 
‘adult interdependent partner.’ Generally, legislation extends the same rights, bene-
fits, and obligations to adult interdependent partners and spouses. Adult interde-
pendent partners and spouses have the same rights and obligations relating to sup-
port, intestate succession, maintenance and support from an estate, and for many 
other purposes.”). 
246. Id. at ¶ 186.
247. See, e.g., Workers’ Compensation Act, R.S.A. 2000, c W-15, §§ 49, 71 (Can.).
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a deceased partner under the same circumstances as a spouse.248 AIPs al-
so have the right to inherit a share of an estate assigned by law, irrespec-
tive of the content of the will.249 An AIP can also claim “spousal” sup-
port obligations.250 However, a major gap between married couples and 
AIPs persists in the division of property upon dissolution of the rela-
tionship. Unlike spouses, AIPs do not enjoy a right to equal property 
division of “non-exempt” property upon separation.251
The enactment of the law followed the Canadian Supreme Court 
decision that discrimination based on sexual orientation was constitu-
tionally impermissible under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms.252 Shortly thereafter, an Alberta surrogate court253 held that a sep-
arate law, denying survivorship benefits for LGBT partners, was 
unconstitutional.254 The two decisions fueled a massive mobilization by 
socially conservative Christians in Alberta.255 The groups coalesced to 
pass AIRA in order to dilute protection for same-sex couples by creating 
a registration system that would be open to a wide range of non-marital 
couples.256 It is thus ironic that AIRA, which was originally intended to 
marginalize a subset of non-normative families (LGBT families), has be-
come a guarantor of the rights of nearly all non-normative families.
The system created by AIRA is a mixed one. It sets forth two dif-
ferent models of recognition for non-married couples:
248. See Vogel LLP Lawyers, Adult Interdependent Relationships and Estates, 114 ACTLA’S 
“THE BARRISTER” MAGAZINE, (Dec. 1, 2014) https://www.vogel-llp.ca/resources/.
249. Id.
250. Cohabiting Relationships and Adult Interdependent Partners, CALGARY LEGAL 
GUIDANCE, http://clg.ab.ca/programs-services/dial-a-law/cohabiting-relationships-
and-adult-independent-partners-2/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
251. The automatic right to equal property division is established under the Matrimonial 
Property Act, R.S.A. 2000, c M-8 (Can.), which only applies to married couples.
252. Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage, (2004) 3 S.C.R. 698; Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, R.S.C. 1985, app II, no 44.
253. A surrogate court typically has jurisdiction over the wills and estates of deceased peo-
ple. In Alberta, The Court of Queen’s Bench oversees surrogate matters. The Court 
of Queen’s Bench, Jurisdiction and Governance, ALBERTA COURTS, https://
albertacourts.ca/qb/about/jurisdiction-and-governance (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
254. Johnson v. Sand, (2001) 91 Alta. L.R. 3d 249 (Alta. Surr. Ct.) (citing to M v. H, 
(1999) 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.)) (finding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the 
definition of “common law spouse” is unconstitutionally contrary to Section 15 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
255. Bala, supra note 170.
256. Id.; see also ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, supra note 36, at 208 (“A few re-
spondents opposed [the recommendation that property division rules should apply to 
adult interdependent partners] because they consider AIRA as a whole to be flawed. 
In their view, AIRA was designed to avoid explicitly recognizing same sex relation-
ships for political reasons. They believe AIRA is not based on sound policy.”)
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1. Contractual model: parties can sign a written agreement to 
become adult interdependent partners;257
2. Ascription model: parties acquire the AIP status if they live 
in a three-year, interdependent relationship or a relationship 
“of some permanence” where there is a child—as long as 
there is no formal, written intent to not acquire the AIP 
status.258 As previously noted, however, persons related to 
each other by blood or adoption are not eligible for ascription 
and may only become adult interdependent partners by 
written agreement.259
As a general matter, to become AIPs there must be a “relationship 
of interdependence.”260 The condition is met where parties “(i) share 
one another’s lives, (ii) are emotionally committed to one another, and 
(iii) function as an economic and domestic unit.”261 At this point, 
despite the neutral language seen above, the Legislature of Alberta added
conjugality in the scheme.262 To determine when parties “function as an 
economic and domestic unit,” the following elements must be taken 
into account: 
(a) whether or not the persons have a conjugal
relationship; 
(b) the degree of exclusivity of the relationship; 
(c) the conduct and habits of the persons in respect of 
household activities and living arrangements; 
(d) the degree to which the persons hold themselves out 
to others as an economic and domestic unit; 
(e) the degree to which the persons formalize their legal 
obligations, intentions and responsibilities toward one 
another; 
(f) the extent to which direct and indirect contributions 
have been made by either person to the other or to their 
mutual well-being; 
257. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A–4.5, §3(1)(b) (Can.).
258. Adult Interdependent Relationships Actt §3(1)(a).
259. Since these partnerships are formalized through a private contract, there are no statis-
tics on the number of contracted AIPs since the enactment of the law.
260. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A–4.5, §§1(1)(f), 3–4 (Can.).
261. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act §1(1)(f).
262. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act §1(2). This move was perhaps unintentional 
and the result of the passivity with which the Legislature relied on the previous case 
law to establish a common law marriage.
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(g) the degree of financial dependence or 
interdependence and any arrangements for financial support 
between the persons; 
(h) the care and support of children; 
(i) the ownership, use, and acquisition of property.263
The Alberta Legislature’s drafting decisions—specifically, the deci-
sion to include conjugality as an element of a domestic unit—seem to 
constrain what qualifies as an AIP to the realm of the romantic, conjugal 
couple.264 While criteria (c) through (i) tend to be applicable to non-
conjugal interdependent relationships, criteria (a) and (b) clearly point 
to conjugality as the marker of familyhood. This aspect is worrisome in 
that it excludes non-conjugal couples by definition. 
However, the interpretation of conjugality in Alberta’s courts indi-
cates that “conjugality” is not synonymous with “sexual activity.”265 In 
Alberta, conjugality has been interpreted to include a range of relation-
ships, including a less intimate, non-sexual relationship.266 Pursuant to 
this case law, the absence of a “physical relationship” or a shared bed
was not determinative; courts have been satisfied that conjugality existed 
when parties “enjoyed each other’s company, dined together, sometimes 
slept together, traveled together and visited mutual friends together.”267
As in the case of conjugality, the Legislature’s condition that a rela-
tionship have a high degree of “exclusivity” is borrowed from the se-
mantics of marriage.268 Exclusivity has little heuristic value for non-
conjugal couples; it also does little to identify non-traditional conjugal 
couples, whose parties can be deeply committed and yet non-
exclusive.269 As a purely textual matter, the choice to list these criteria at 
263. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act §1(2) (emphasis added).
264. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act §1(2).
265. See, e.g., Riley Estate (Re), (2014) 603 A.R. 1 (Can. Alta. Q.B.) (claiming relief as the 
beneficiary of the deceased estate based on the existence of an exclusive relationship); 
Kiernan v. Stach Estate, (2009) 465 A.R. 261 (Can. Alta. Q.B.).
266. See, e.g., Riley Estate (Re), (2014) 603 A.R. 1, at ¶ 96 (Can. Alta. Q.B.) (claiming 
relief as the beneficiary of the deceased estate based on the existence of an exclusive 
relationship); Kiernan v. Stach Estate, (2009) 465 A.R. 261, at ¶ 45 (Can. Alta. 
Q.B.).
267. Riley Estate (Re), 603 A.R. at para. 95.
268. See Jane Adolphe, The Principles and the Canada’s “Beyond Conjugality” Report: The 
Move Toward Abolition of State Marriage Laws, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY:
CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION 355 (Robin Fretwell ed., 2006) (citing Cormac Burke, Object of Mat-
rimonial Consent – A Personalist Analysis, 9 F. 39, 70 (1998)).
269. Rosenbury, supra note 60 at 229–30.
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the top of the list is controversial in that these requirements essentially 
percolate down—they can affect the interpretation of the remaining 
ones. However, lower courts have laid out a holistic approach to deter-
mining whether parties constitute an economic and domestic unit, with 
no single factor carrying more weight than the others.270 This approach 
helps mitigate the effects of this drafting decision and should, in princi-
ple, allow courts to extend the scheme to families other than conjugal 
families. Still, from the face of the text, it is clear that the “ideal” adult 
interdependent partnership would be an opposite-sex or same-sex con-
jugal couple, either raising a child or cohabitating for three years.271
That concern that only conjugal couples would take advantage of 
the scheme has been realized.272 A legal analysis I conducted over a sam-
ple of 50 cases that address the Alberta courts’ application of AIRA re-
veals that lawsuits have exclusively been brought by conjugal couples. 
The results of this analysis are confirmed by a recent survey conducted 
by the Alberta Law Reform Institute, which found essentially no evi-
dence of non-conjugal AIPs.273 This might be evidence that Canadian 
courts emphasize a specific romantic, conjugal notion of partnership. If 
so, it suggests that there is an incentive for couples to frame themselves 
as if they were conjugal, romantic couples—even if they are not. The 
trend could also be linked to a lack of awareness that it’s possible for 
non-conjugal couples to enter formal relationships. While this Article is 
270. Kiernan v. Stach Estate, 2009 ABQB 150, para 42 (Can.).
271. ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, supra note 36, at ¶ 243 (“Whether or not sexual 
relations are a necessary part of a conjugal relationship, it is likely that the vast major-
ity of adult interdependent relationships are between partners who have or had sexual 
relations.”).
272. See, e.g., Knight v. Wowk, 2015 ABPC 286 (Can.) (plaintiff seeking an order requir-
ing the former common-law partner to pay spousal support); R.F.T. v. O.K.G., 2007 
ABPC 70 (Can.) (plaintiff filing an application for child support from the conjugal 
partner and biological parent of the child).
273. ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, supra note 36, at ¶¶ 215, 241:
“At many of our presentations and roundtables, we asked lawyers about 
their experience with non-conjugal adult interdependent partners. We 
asked whether anyone had encountered a case where a non-conjugal rela-
tionship was alleged or found to be an adult interdependent relationship. 
Many lawyers with years of experience in family law or wills and estates
attended our presentations and roundtables, but almost no one indicated 
they had encountered such a case. . . There are no reported cases where 
unrelated roommates who did not have sexual relations were found to be 
adult interdependent partner. When we asked lawyers at our meetings 
and roundtables whether they were aware of non-conjugal adult interde-
pendent partners, they did not identify any cases involving unrelated 
roommates.”.
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not the proper venue to engage in inquiries over causation, it is still 
worth flagging this trend and the ways in which the AIRA is not serving
non-conjugal unions. 
Despite these findings, I believe AIRA contributes to a healthy cul-
ture of non-conjugality because it makes these relationships visible in 
the eyes of the law. The law can change the way the parties themselves 
think of their relationships—not as something aberrant or incidental 
but as relationships that enjoy social and juridical relevance. AIRA can 
help to foster the culture it seeks to regulate. 
A recent case in Alberta is instructive for the fostering of such cul-
ture. There, two interdependent siblings in Alberta sought an extension 
of the federal Canada Pension Plan survivor’s pension—a public bene-
fit—to their relationship.274 Although rejected on jurisdictional grounds, 
the case shows the increased visibility of new families. Laws like AIRA 
can help these relationships self-identify as one group, capable of ad-
vancing its own agenda.
C. Conservative Bills in Alabama and Missouri Move Toward a
Contractual Model
When the United States Supreme Court handed down Obergefell v. 
Hodges in 2015, many probate judges across the country responded by 
refusing to issue marriage licenses entirely.275 They argued for doing 
away with state-sponsored marriage altogether and leaving in its place 
civil contracts.276 The goal was to expand the availability of civil con-
tracts and make marriage a private institution. 
To that end, many state legislatures began to introduce socially 
conservative bills277 including Oklahoma’s (which proposed replacing 
marriage licenses with common law marriage affidavits),278 Alabama’s
274. E. H. v. Minister of Emp’t & Soc. Dev., 2017 SSTGDIS 3, No. GP-16-2741
(Can.).
275. Michael C. Dorf, Does the Constitution Permit a State to Abolish Marriage?, VERDICT 
(Mar. 21, 2018), https://verdict.justia.com/2018/03/21/constitution-permit-state-
abolish-marriage.
276. Id.
277. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). See Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. 
Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1207 (2016), for a discussion 
on the ruling; see also Kenji Yoshino, The Supreme Court, 2014 Term – Comment: A 
New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 162–79
(2015).
278. H.B. 1125, 2017 Sess. (Okla. 2017), http://www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?
Bill=HB1125&Session=1600.
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(which proposed replacing marriage licenses with civil contracts),279 and 
Missouri (which proposed replacing marriage licenses with civil un-
ions).280 None of the bills passed.281 Although motivated by conservative 
animus to same-sex marriage and reluctance to implement the Supreme
Court’s Obergefell decision, the bills also offered a possible solution to 
the lack of protections for new families.
The Oklahoma legislation aimed to replace civil marriage with 
common law marriage affidavits or marriage certificates.282 The proposal 
passed in the House and then received a second reading in the Senate, 
but never got off the ground.283 In the version of the bill approved by 
the Oklahoma House of Representatives, the state would no longer issue 
marriage licenses.284 Instead, it would only “record” marriage certifi-
cates285 or common law marriage affidavits286 through its clerks, provid-
ed that the couple met all the legal conditions for entering into a valid 
marriage.287 The officiating of marriage ceremonies would therefore be 
left to private actors and religious communities.288
In Alabama, Senate Bill 143 was approved by the Senate on March 
25, 2016,289 but it did not come to a vote in the Alabama House before 
the end of the legislative session.290 It was revived as Senate Bill 20 in 
2017, but suffered the same fate.291 In the original version, marriage 
279. S. 13, 2018 Sess. (Ala. 2018), https://legiscan.com/AL/bill/SB13/2018; see also S.B. 
20, 2017 Sess. (Ala. 2017), https://legiscan.com/AL/bill/SB20/2017 for the previous 
version of the bill.
280. H.B. 1434, 2018 Sess. (Mo. 2018), https://legiscan.com/MO/bill/HB1434/2018; see 
also H.B. 62, 2017 Sess. (Mo. 2017), https://legiscan.com/MO/text/HB62/2017 for 
the first version of the bill.
281. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Divorcing Marriage and the State Post-Obergefell, in THE 
CONTESTED PLACE OF RELIGION IN FAMILY LAW 415 (2018).
282. The Oklahoma bill is therefore different from the bills proposed in Alabama and 
Missouri, which aimed to replace marriage licenses with civil contracts.
283. Id.
284. H.R. 1125, 2015 Sess. (Okla. 2015), http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us/cf_pdf/2015-
16%20ENGR/hB/HB1125%20ENGR.PDF.
285. H.R. 1125.
286. H.R. 1125 § (7)(E).
287. Id. The bill would have made civil contracts available to all adult couples by erasing 
the requirement that marriage is between one person and “a person of the opposite 
sex.”
288. Greg Horton, Oklahoma Bill Would Give Clergy Power Over Marriage Licenses,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2015, 4:18 PM), https://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/12/oklahoma-gay-marriage_n_6858424.html.
289. S.B. 143, 2016 Sess. (Ala. 2016), https://legiscan.com/AL/bill/SB143/2016.
290. S.B. 143.
291. S.B. 20, 2017 Sess. (Ala. 2017), https://legiscan.com/AL/bill/SB20/2017. The new 
bill was reviewed and approved 9-0 on February 23, 2017 by the Senate Judicial 
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licenses would be replaced with “marriage contracts.”292 The 2017 bill 
scaled back that proposal, and instead abolished the issuance of a license 
and solemnization as requisites for entering a valid marriage.293 Under 
the new bill, probate judges were required to accept affidavits—attesting 
that the parties were consenting, unmarried, unrelated adults—as 
official records of marriage.294
This reform, like that in Oklahoma, was likely driven by the desire 
“to excuse government officials who oppose same-sex marriage on reli-
gious or other grounds from having to issue marriage licenses to same-
sex couples.”295 The battle over refusing to issue marriage licenses post-
Obergefell was particularly heated in Alabama, and reached its peak in 
June 2016, when Chief Justice Roy S. Moore of the Supreme Court of 
Alabama issued an administrative order to Alabama lower court judges 
directing them to disobey the Supreme Court's ruling in Obergefell. 296
The order led to the Chief Justice’s suspension for ethics violations.297
Ahead of the legislative session in 2017, Missouri representatives 
filed House Bill 62, which replaced the word “marriage” with the term 
“contract of domestic union” everywhere it appeared in the state code.298
When it failed to get approval, the representatives pre-filed a similar bill 
for 2018.299 At the time of publication of this Article, that bill was again 
stalled in the House.300 The law omitted any reference to parties’ gen-
ders, and allowed any two consenting adults to have their “contract of 
domestic union” registered for notification purposes.301 As in Oklahoma 
and Alabama, the law was driven by the desire to relieve clerks from of-
Committee. It was later approved by the state senate on March 8, 2017, by a 22-6
vote. Again, it did not gain the final approval of the state house.
292. Fretwell Wilson, supra note 281. The term “contract is not synonymous with “li-
cense.” With licenses, the state confers the status and polices access to it. With con-
tracts, parties can freely decide to accept the status once eligibility conditions are met.
293. S.B. 13, 2017 Sess. (Ala. 2017), http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/ALISON/Searc 
hableInstruments/2018RS/PrintFiles/SB13-int.pdf.
294. Id. at § 2.
295. Dorf, supra note 275.
296. See Campbell Robertson, Roy Moore, Alabama Chief Justice, Suspended Over Gay Mar-
riage Order, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/01/us/
roy-moore-alabama-chief-justice.html.
297. Id.
298. H.B. 62, 99th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg, Sess (Mo. 2017), https://legiscan.com/MO/
text/HB62/2017.
299. H.B. 1434, 99th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017), https://legiscan.com/MO/
bill/HB1434/2018.
300. Id.
301. H.B. 62; H.B. 1434.
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ficiating marriages that went against their personal and religious convic-
tions.302
In all three states, the act of registering the relationship with the 
government was only for notification purposes; the registration itself did 
not confer any rights or obligations.303 This limited role of registration 
was a crucial change. Under the contractual models like those proposed 
in Alabama and Missouri, a new couple becomes legally partnered or 
“married” upon stipulation of the contract.304 The legal status attaches
not at the moment the state approved the transaction, as is the case with 
marriage, but at the moment the contract is executed (Missouri) or the 
marriage is executed (Alabama).305 It is thus the contract/affidavit alone
that triggers the legal consequences of “being married.”
These bills establish a path forward for new families. In particular,
the bills in Missouri and Alabama establish a variation on the traditional
contractual model that is notable for two reasons:
(1) Unlike a pure contractual model, the private law 
instruments proposed in Missouri and Alabama would bind
not just the parties themselves but also the government and 
third parties, such as insurance companies and employers.306
It is the state that confers upon the parties the power to 
302. See generally TJ Martinell, Missouri Bill Would Eliminate State Marriage Licenses,
10TH AMEND. CTR.: TENTHER BLOG (Dec. 14, 2016), http://
blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2016/12/missouri-bill-would-eliminate-state-
marriage-licenses/; see also Dorf, supra note 275.
303. For Missouri, see H.B. 62, 99th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg, Sess (Mo. 2017), https://
legiscan.com/MO/text/HB62/2017 (providing certain provisions relating to all pri-
vate law entitlements, which are triggered by the contract, and stating that in order to 
be eligible for spouse benefits, “the surviving spouse and the deceased member shall 
have been parties to a contract of domestic union on the date of the personal injury re-
sulting in the member’s death or on the date of onset of the disease resulting in the 
member’s death.”) (emphasis added). For Alabama, see S.B. 20, 2017 Sess. (Ala. 
2017), https://legiscan.com/AL/bill/SB20/2017 (clarifying that the marriage is valid 
on the date the marriage is executed by both parties, and that registration comes only 
later). For Oklahoma, see H.B. 1125, 2017 Sess. (Okla. 2017), http://www.
oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=HB1125&Session=1600 (providing that the clerk 
of the court “shall make a complete record of the marriage certificate or affidavit.”).
304. S. 13, 2018 Sess. (Ala. 2018), https://legiscan.com/AL/bill/SB13/2018;
H.B. 1434, 2018 Sess. (Mo. 2018), https://legiscan.com/MO/bill/HB1434/2018.
305. S. 13, 2018 Sess. (Ala. 2018), https://legiscan.com/AL/bill/SB13/2018; H.B. 1434, 
2018 Sess. (Mo. 2018), https://legiscan.com/MO/bill/HB1434/2018.
306. See H.B. 62, 99th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg, Sess (Mo. 2017), https://legiscan.com/MO/
text/HB62/2017 (providing a host of public law entitlements).
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acquire the status of “married couple” and the benefits that 
follow;307 and
(2) It saves the parties the trouble of articulating a 
comprehensive regime, as they can enjoy the default legal 
framework of marriage. This overcomes many of the 
problems associated with private contracting, such that the 
benefits flowing from the contract could be as flexible, 
efficient, and comprehensive as that of traditional marriage.308
Formal recognition of non-traditional families, such as same-sex 
couples and polyamorous relationships, is a source of heated debate.309
The decision to dignify some relationships and not others is delicate and 
ideologically driven, and it involves essential choices that touch on issues 
of law, public policy, moral philosophy, and political theory.310 When 
the state accords statuses, it sanctions familyhood and confers the ex-
pressive benefits of recognition.311 It is therefore an added benefit of 
these contractual models that they avoid seeking the state’s express ap-
proval of the relationship. This approach dodges the social conflict that 
is intrinsic in the highly contentious decision about which relationships 
to recognize.312
I understand the tensions with embracing laws that are designed 
with oppression in mind. But queer activists should be mindful of 
Wundt’s “heterogony of ends” principle, which argues that a group of 
people—even one with different or changing motivations—can still ad-
vance one goal.313 The laws proposed in Missouri, Oklahoma, and Ala-
307. By contrast, a pure private law model does not bind the government or third parties. 
See Leckey, supra note 53, at 12.
308. Id. (“A difficulty with private ordering in the family setting is that the ordinary rules 
of contract may prove less adaptable than legislated family regimes. For example, leg-
islated regimes provide a means to vary support obligations where circumstances have 
changed, whereas a private agreement to pay support may not have provided a way to 
respond to changes.”).
309. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BRAKE, MINIMIZING MARRIAGE 135–39 (2012); SEX,
PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997); 
see also METZ, supra note 22.
310. See generally, Nussbaum, supra note 13.
311. Id. at 671–72.
312. See id.
313. The expression “heterogony of ends” (in the original German version, Heterogonie der 
Zwecke) was coined by the psychologist Wilhelm Wundt. Wundt argues that human 
behavior has ever-changing goals, and thus, that which was the original purpose for 
engaging in certain conduct can be complemented or replaced by a later purpose. See
Voce “eterogenesi dei fini” in TRECCANI DICTIONARY (2009), http://www.
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bama have certain positive attributes. They confer a legal status without 
regard to the gender of the parties. They preserve the default regime, 
and thereby avoid some of the most onerous aspects of private contracts. 
They exalt individual autonomy by leaving entirely to the parties the 
decision of whether to enter into a marriage and when a partnership 
should trigger legal effects.314
These laws were not perfect. If enacted, recognition would still 
have been restricted to couples “eligible to marry,” such that two blood 
relatives would not have been protected. They were also limited to rela-
tionships involving two individuals, but no more. These bills can there-
fore serve as models for the path forward, but need progressive amend-
ments.
Section III responds to criticisms about recognition of new fami-
lies, and offers some notes and recommendations on how the political 
action of queer activists should be reframed to foster family legal plural-
ism.  
Section III
The Way Forward: Reframing Political Action 
A. Anticipating Criticisms to Recognition
In grappling with legal solutions to protect new families, I have 
taken for granted that these families ought to obtain legal recognition.
But should they? Recognition often comes with a cost—either actual 
(financial) or metaphorical (the cost of assimilation)—to both the 
family and society. This is one of a handful of objections to legally 
recognizing new families.315 I will anticipate these potential objections 
and pose counterarguments to them. 
The first of these objections can be abstracted from the debate 
within feminist legal scholarship on the privatization of care, which pos-
its an argument about the risk that recognition might transfer care du-
ties from the state to private individuals. A second criticism warns 
against the financial cost associated with recognition. A third one flags 
treccani.it/enciclopedia/eterogenesi-dei-fini_%28Dizionario-di-filosofia%29/ (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2018).
314. Again, registering a relationship with the state clerk does not, itself, produce legal ef-
fects, but instead serves only to inform the government of the existence of the rela-
tionship.
315. See infra Section III.A.1–A.5.
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the problems associated with normalization and assimilation of new 
families into existing family categories. A fourth raises concerns that 
people will exploit existing regimes to strategically gain benefits. Finally,
I will examine the argument that recognizing new families, especially 
non-conjugal ones, would not be in the best interest of any children in 
such a family. 
1. Does Recognition Mean that Care is “Privatized”?
One camp in the debate around the recognition of new families 
opposes recognition of new families on the theory that doing so would 
result in a shift in caregiving responsibilities from the state onto family 
members.316 Critics are concerned that the burden to care for elderly or 
dependent individuals—a burden that would otherwise be borne by the 
state—would shift to the newly-recognized family member(s).317 I un-
derstand this concern, but I believe that the dangers associated with 
recognition are outweighed by the advantages that flow from it. 
Privatization of care is not unique to the question of new families, 
and refers generally to the externalization of caregiving duties from the 
public to the private sphere.318 This is widely acknowledged as a prob-
lem in feminist literature, political philosophy, and family law scholar-
ship.319 This side of the debate is focused on the state’s financial incen-
tives to recognize new families and enforce key private law consequences 
of recognition, like spousal support.320 Under this line of thinking, poli-
cymakers are interested in extending private obligations between citizens 
in order to avoid additional government outlay.321 Thus, the more types 
of families that are legislatively recognized, the more providers of infor-
mal care are called on to provide private law support obligations.322
316. See generally Susan B. Boyd & Claire F.L. Young, From Same-Sex to No Sex?: Trends 
Towards Recognition of (Same-Sex) Relationships in Canada, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST.
757, 784 (2003); BRIAN SLOAN, INFORMAL CAREERS AND PRIVATE LAW 213 (2013).
317. SLOAN, supra note 316 at 136–206.
318. See e.g., BRENDA COSSMAN & JUDY FUDGE, PRIVATIZATION, LAW, AND THE 
CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM 18 (2002).
319. Id.
320. Boyd & Young, supra note 316, at 784 (2003) (“offload[ing] responsibility onto 
those private relationships . . . result[s] in more expectations being made of those re-
lationships in terms of taking care of ‘their own’.”).
321. Id.
322. See, e.g., Ivana Isailovic, Same Sex but Not the Same: Same-Sex Marriage in the United 
States and France and the Universalist Narrative, 66 AM. J. COMP. L. 267, 295 (2018) 
(making the argument with respect to recognition of same-sex couples through mar-
riage).
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From time to time this concern is realized. For instance, in enact-
ing the Designated Beneficiary Act, the Colorado legislature openly 
acknowledged that the goal of wider recognition was to “reduc[e] reli-
ance on public programs and services.”323 Another example is the Su-
preme Court of Canada’s decision in M v. H,324 delivered by Justice 
Frank Iacobucci: “[T]he objectives of the statute were to provide for the 
equitable resolution of economic disputes when intimate relationships 
between financially interdependent individuals break down, and to alle-
viate the burden on the public purse to provide for dependent spouses.”325
Of course, it is more complex than that. Many scholars have ar-
gued that the financial incentives flow the other way: that the state has a 
financial interest to ignore new families so that it does not have to pro-
vide tax breaks, social assistance, and other subsidies.326 Often upon 
recognition there are a number of public law benefits that flow to the
relationship.327 In Egan v. Canada (1995), the Supreme Court of Cana-
da found that withholding old-age security allowance to a gay couple 
was constitutionally permissible.328 In so concluding, Justice Sopinka ar-
gued that the “government must be accorded some flexibility in extend-
ing social benefits and does not have to be proactive in recognizing new 
social relationships. It is not realistic for the Court to assume that there 
are unlimited funds to address the needs of all.”329
The problem is that both sides of the debate are right. Recognition 
entails both the privatization of care through the enforcement of private 
obligations and an increase in public expenditures through the extension 
of social benefits. However, the increase of public outlays is often coun-
terbalanced by a commensurate increase in tax revenue and a reduction 
323. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-102(1)(d) (2009) (“The power of individuals to 
care for one another and take action to be personally responsible for themselves and 
their loved ones is of tremendous societal benefit, enabling self-determination and re-
ducing reliance on public programs and services.”).
324. M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
325. M. v. H., 2 S.C.R. 3 (emphasis added).
326. For an overview of this side of the debate, see Harder, supra note 2, at 652–53; see 
also Katherine Spensieri, Proxy-mate: Revitalizing the Spousal Support Regime for Non-
conjugal Adult Personal Relationships and the Case of Caregiving, 36 CAN. FAM. L.Q.
107, 112 (2016).
327. In the wake of the Windsor and Obergefell decisions extending legal protections to 
same-sex couples, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) is slowly widening the 
notion of family through interpretative guidance documents. See United States v. 
Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). SOC.
SEC. ADMIN., GN 00210.004—SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS—NON-MARITAL LEGAL 
RELATIONSHIPS (2016), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0200210004.
328. Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 516 (Can.).
329. Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 516.
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in social welfare benefits as a result of the increased income of the par-
ties.330
The “private-public responsibility dichotomy” deserves a separate 
and much deeper discussion.331 I am unpersuaded by arguments that le-
gal recognition should not be conferred because it would result in pri-
vatized care. The caregivers who seek legal recognition as a family do so 
intentionally. If they believe that they would be better off by gaining 
recognition—or that recognition is vital to their equality and dignity in 
the public space—then I do not think abstract ideas about duties of care 
are sufficiently compelling to withhold recognition. The concern that 
private law obligations would privatize care is valid, but not substantial.
2. The Cost of Recognition to New Families:
A Pragmatic, Autonomy-Driven Approach
Legal recognition often comes with a price.332 Sometimes, legal 
recognition will make families financially worse-off.333 This is frequently
the case with government programs that are means-tested, as in the case 
of Medicaid or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in the U.S.334 In 
such programs both spouses’ finances are considered to determine eligi-
bility, such that a couple’s married status might cause them to be ineli-
gible (they make too much money), where before, as two individuals, 
they might have qualified.335 Extending recognition to new families 
could similarly cost them their welfare or social security benefits. 
It matters also if the benefit is conferred through a default regime. 
Without a default regime, parties bear the burden of protecting them-
selves through contracts, power of attorney documents, and other legal 
tools. By the same token, a default regime imports certain presumptions 
from traditional marriage, such as mutual trust (in the context of evi-
330. See infra Section III.A.2. Kim Brooks reports that taxpayers in Canada often argue 
that they are not in a spousal relationship because such status would “reduce access to 
child tax benefits, the goods and services tax credit, or the equivalent-to-spouse cred-
it, all of which require consideration of the income of the taxpayer’s spouse.” See Kim 
Brooks, Cameos from the Margins of Conjugality, in AFTER LEGAL EQUALITY 111 
(Robert Leckey ed., 2015).
331. Spensieri, supra note 326.
332. See Aloni, supra note 91, at 1285–86
333. Polikoff, supra note 26, at 548.
334. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK § 2102 (2017), https://
www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/handbook/handbook.21/handbook-toc21.html.
335. Id. at § 2113, 2122.3 (B).
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dentiary privileges), income pooling (in the field of tax law), social bene-
fits, and parenting responsibilities.336
This argument has more or less traction depending on if the recog-
nition is sought, as in the case of a contractual model, or is ascribed on-
to the partners. When recognition is the result of a deliberate choice, it 
might well be the case that parties are ready to lose a public benefit—
because they anticipate they will gain others, or because they perceive 
that recognition will be better for them long-term. Likewise, financial 
costs are particularly troublesome when neither partner chooses to gain 
recognition, as in the case of pure ascription. Recognition is not synon-
ymous with protection. I am in favor of according more legal benefits to 
non-traditional families, but I am concerned about reckless progressiv-
ism that would confer a legal status onto parties who do not seek it.337
Therefore, concerns about costs should be reframed as one touch-
ing upon issues of personal autonomy. An approach more respectful of 
personal autonomy must acknowledge the possible adverse effects of le-
gal recognition and let families decide whether to take on these conse-
quences. Of course, it is the state’s responsibility to enable parties to 
make this decision by providing a formal scheme into which they can 
freely enter. 
3. The Assimilation Conundrum338
Marriage is a normalizing force.339 As more individuals decide to 
get married, the choice to not get married becomes more “abnormal,”
which can be detrimental to unmarried couples.340 Critics argue that le-
gal recognition of new families has the same result. In seeking recogni-
tion, a non-normative relationship risks being drawn into the sphere of 
336. Courtney G. Joslin, Marriage Equality and Its Relationship to Family Law, 129 HARV.
L. REV. FORUM 197, 202 (2016).
337. See supra Section I.B.
338. The next three subsections are named after episodes of the seventh season of the CBS 
television show The Big Bang Theory (broadcast Sept. 26, 2013 through May 15, 
2014).
339. I use Foucault’s notion of normalization here. For further discussion, see Janet Hal-
ley, Recognition, Rights, Regulation, Normalization: Rhetorics of Justification of the 
Same-Sex Marriage Debate, in THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX 
PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 97, 
100 n.7 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenas eds., 2001).
340. See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 25, at 272.
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influence of the heterosexual marriage, and thereby losing its distinctive 
qualities.341
While this concern about assimilation has been frequently voiced 
in regards to same-sex couples seeking access to marriage,342 it is not yet 
clear that recognition through a marriage alternative would yield similar 
normalizing effects. I believe that it would, albeit to a lesser extent.
Non-conjugal relationships such as cohabiting relatives provide an illus-
trative example: While these relationships suffer from comparative invis-
ibility in the legal space, in the few cases where they have gained official 
recognition, they had to comply with marriage-like criteria.343 Consider 
Alberta’s Adult Interdependent Relationships Act of 2003, which per-
mits any two people to be recognized as Adult Interdependent Partners 
(AIPs) through an agreement or ascription.344 As outlined above, for a 
couple to be recognized as such a partnership, they must bear the fol-
lowing characteristics: 
(i) share one another’s lives,
(ii) [be] emotionally committed to one another, and
(iii) function as an economic and domestic unit,”345
which includes a conjugal relationship and a “degree of 
exclusivity.”346
As previously discussed, under the holistic approach of the Alberta 
family courts, lack of marital-like features such as conjugality or fidelity 
need not prevent formal recognition where other relevant criteria are 
present.347 However, the inclusion of these factors, along with the man-
datory dyadic structure—that an adult interdependent partnership can 
only be between two people—suggests that the legislation drafters could 
hardly do without the traditional features of marital relationships.348
341. See SYCAMORE supra note 25; Cossman supra note 27; Ettelbrick supra note 25;
Feinberg supra note 25; Polikoff supra note 26; Robson & Valentine supra note 30;
Scott supra note 20.
342. See Cossman, supra note 27 (“The radical pluralist position argues that our relation-
ships do not fit the model of the heterosexual family. Gay and lesbian relationships 
are not functionally equivalent to heterosexual relationships—they are not necessarily 
based on sexual monogamy or emotional exclusivity.”).
343. This is especially evident in the case of the Alberta’s scheme, infra Section B.
344. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002,  c A-4.5, §1 (Can.).
345. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002,  c A-4.5, §1(1)(f) (Can.).
346. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002,  c A-4.5, §1(2) (Can.).
347. Kiernan v. Stach Estate, 2009 ABQB 150, para 42 (Can.).
348. This includes factors such as conjugality, exclusivity, etc. See infra Section II.B.
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From this example we can conclude that the danger of assimilation 
into the marital norm is always present. But it is not a lost cause, and 
with some awareness on the part of the legislature, this concern can be 
mitigated. Lawmakers should craft legal remedies so that they avoid in-
cluding unnecessary and normative eligibility criteria, such as conjugali-
ty and exclusivity.  
4. The Adverse-Selection Problem
Some critics are concerned that expanding recognition to new fam-
ilies could increase fraud. Their worry is that more parties will self-
identify as families to claim government or employment benefits, or else
refuse to self-identify as families when recognition could impose obliga-
tions.349
This problem has been acknowledged in determining social assis-
tance eligibility for unmarried conjugal couples in Canada.350 The likeli-
hood of fraud, however, can be more or less extreme depending on the 
model of protection adopted. Canada’s model is ascriptive.351 An ascrip-
tive model nudges parties into adverse selection because the model as-
sesses the family’s status at each point of offering a government benefit 
or obligation, rather than in one permanent determination, according to
the conditions of eligibility for each government benefit.352 Thus, a cou-
ple could be considered a family for one benefits scheme but not a fami-
ly for another. This encourages families to game the system in a manner
most strategic for them.
This drawback of the ascriptive model is not present in more for-
malist models of recognition such as registration or contracts. Under 
those schemes, once parties have been recognized through a comprehen-
sive approach, their status is fixed until dissolution. They cannot modify 
their associated obligations in order to game the system.
The potential for fraud is therefore offset in cases where there is a 
complete package of rights and obligations that flow from status 
349. Bala, supra note 170 at 94 n.140.
350. Id. (“The adverse selection issue is already a problem with informal (i.e. non-marital) 
conjugal relationships, for example in determining social assistance (in)eligibility, 
though there will generally be more indicia and records available to help make this 
determination than for non-conjugal relationships.”).
351. Christine Davies, The Extension of Martial Rights and Obligations to the Unmarried: 
Registered Domestic Partnerships and Other Methods, 17 CAN. FAM. L.Q. 248, 256 
(1999).
352. See Bala, supra note 170, at 94 n.140.
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recognition, including private law obligations of support, rather than 
various rights and obligations assigned piecemeal. By contrast, any 
benefit-by-benefit approach that attaches legal status for one purpose 
only, such as the current ascriptive regime in Canada, presents a risk of 
fraud.353 This is another reason to resist the ascriptive model.
Other versions of fraud—where individuals hold themselves out to 
be a family when they are not—are still present under formal recogni-
tion models. But the danger of fraud in these contexts is no more or less 
pronounced than the risk of fraudulent marriage—a problem that has 
existed and been dealt with for as long as benefits have accrued to mari-
tal status. 
Of course, courts know that there are several reasons aside from 
romantic ones that may motivate a person’s decision to marry, such as 
family approval or favorable tax laws, and that policing entry into mar-
riage is impossible.354 To that end there is an ongoing debate on how the 
welfare system in the United States impacts people’s marital choices.355
For instance, anecdotal findings suggest that the decision to get married 
(as opposed to the decision to cohabitate but not marry) is profoundly 
affected by the income tax penalty associated with marriage.356 Profes-
sors Whittington and Alm have extensively studied the issue, and have 
shown that the greater the marriage tax penalty, the more pronounced 
353. Id.
354. For an example in the United States, see United States v. Hall, 74 M.J. 525, 530
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2014). For an example in Canada, see Nova Scotia (Attorney 
Gen.) v. Walsh, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325, 355 (Can.).
355. See, e.g., Leslie A. Whittington & James Alm, The Effects of Public Policy on Marital 
Status in the United States, in MARRIAGE AND THE ECONOMY 76 (Shoshana A. 
Grossbard-Shechtman ed., 2003) (“The U.S. welfare system has probably generated 
more controversy about how public policy affects human behavior than any other 
program.”).
356. More often than not, married couples filing jointly receive a bonus: they pay less than 
the sum of their taxes due if each had filed separately. Only occasionally, their joint 
filing is more than the sum of the respective bills. This is known as the “marriage 
penalty.” It occurs only when the married couple is composed of two income earners, 
and only in the extreme situations where the double-earner family is particularly low-
income or high income. See Lily Kahng, The Not-So-Merry Wives of Windsor: The 
Taxation of Women in Same-Sex Marriages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 332 (2016); 
Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender 
Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 991 (1993); see generally BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTE & URBAN INSTITUTE. Marriage Penalties and Bonuses, TAX POLICY
CENTER, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/topic/individual-taxes/marriage-penalties-
and-bonuses (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
2018] T H E  S T R A N G E  P A I R I N G 223
the impact on relationship decisions: an unmarried couple is less likely 
to marry and a married couple is more likely to divorce.357
U.S. v. Hall sets forth a test for fraud that requires proof of a spe-
cific illicit purpose, either in a marriage context or under a scheme that 
recognizes new families:
It is not the absence of a perfect or ideal “love, honor, 
and cherish” motivation of the parties that renders the 
consequences . . . criminal; rather, it is the affirmative 
presence of a singularly focused illicit one—an intent to 
fraudulently acquire a government payment stream—that 
does so.358
Even with this test, however, some amount of fraudulent marriages 
would likely continue to go undetected and, we can infer, so too with 
new families.359 In this sense, fraud is a natural byproduct of the system. 
5. The Transmogrification of the “Child’s Best Interest” Argument
Finally, scholars have argued that recognition of new families is 
harmful to children’s best interests.360 For example, Professor Nicholas 
Bala has expressed the concern that children can be reared only in a 
normative, conjugal environment:
[W]hile society can no longer equate conjugality with 
procreation, there is still a strong relationship between 
conjugality and children. Conjugality is relevant to both 
psychological and biological parenthood, and there are few 
357. James Alm & Leslie A. Whittington, Does the Income Tax Affect Marital Decisions?,
48 NAT’L TAX J. 565, 570 (1995); James Alm & Leslie A. Whittington, For Love or 
Money? The Impact of Income Taxes on Marriage, 66 ECONOMICA 297, 311 (1999); 
James Alm & Leslie A. Whittington, Income Taxes and the Timing of Marital Deci-
sions, 64 J. PUB. ECON. 219, 238 (1997).
358. Hall, 74 M.J. at 530.
359. LEG. COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE VERMONT CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMMISSION 14 
(2001), available at https://www.sec.state.vt.us/media/689618/ReviewComm2002_
LC-01048.pdf.
360. See Mohammad Al-Sharfi, Karen Pfeffer, & Kirsty A. Miller, The effects of polygamy 
on children and adolescents: a systematic review, 22 J. FAM. STUD. 272 (2016) (finding 
“more mental health problems, social problems and lower academic achievement for 
children and adolescents from polygynous than monogamous families.”); Bala, supra 
note 170, at 97 (stating that “[t]he commitment inherent in a conjugal relationship 
is . . . desirable in establishing an environment in which to raise children.”).
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people who would consider (as a first choice) raising a child 
with a partner who was not in a conjugal relationship with 
them. The commitment inherent in a conjugal relationship is 
also desirable in establishing an environment in which to 
raise children.”361
But I believe that this argument overlooks two points. First, non-
conjugal families can engage in responsible parenting as much as other 
families. In February 2017, an Ontario court issued a declaration of par-
entage to Lynda Collins, the best friend and colleague of Natasha Bakht, 
regarding Bakht’s biological son, Elaan, a profoundly disabled boy with 
spastic quadriplegia.362 Collins had supported Elaan both financially and 
emotionally since his birth, accompanying him to medical visits and 
making crucial decisions about his health, welfare, and education with 
his biological mother.363 The court was thus satisfied that it was in the 
child’s best interest to recognize Collins as a “mother” and issued a dec-
laration of parentage (vertical dimension), regardless of whether Collins 
and Bakht were partnered (horizontal dimension).364 The court correctly 
understood that conjugality is not an inherent feature of childrearing, 
and that Elaan’s best interests were served by considerations of a num-
ber of factors—none of which involved the nature of the relationship 
between Collins and Bakht. 
Second, I believe this argument misses the mark, and confuses the 
vertical and horizontal dimensions of familyhood. The socially-accepted, 
state-subsidized notion of the nuclear family has, among other things, 
effectively linked the worthiness of familyhood to the adults’ willingness 
to raise children.365 This is what families are made for, the thinking goes, 
and hence the will to raise children becomes a clue to the stability and 
commitment of the (conjugal) family bond.366 Undoubtedly, the link 
361. Id.
362. Julie Ireton, Raising Elaan: Profoundly Disabled Boy’s ‘Co-Mommas’ Make Legal Histo-
ry, CBCNEWS (Feb. 21, 2017), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/multimedia/
raising-elaan-profoundly-disabled-boy-s-co-mommas-make-legal-history-1.3988464
(last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
363. Application for Declaration of Parentage, Collins v. Deputy Registrar Gen. (2016),
No. FC-16-862-0 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. of J.).
364. Ireton, supra note 362.
365. See DAN CERE, COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW: LAW AND 
THE MARRIAGE CRISIS IN NORTH AMERICA 13 (2005) (“Another characteristic of 
conjugal marriage is that it is fundamentally child-centered, focused beyond the cou-
ple towards the next generation.”).
366. For a snapshot of the arguments on the importance of marriage in child develop-
ment, as well as some of the reasons to question it, see Martha Garrison, The Chang-
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between marriage and childrearing has ben altered as a result of the 
same-sex marriage struggle, which stressed the functional and intention-
al attributes of parenthood over those rooted in biology367—but one 
could hardly submit that the link between marriage and childrearing has 
weakened.368 Justice Roberts’ view in Obergefell—that “[m]arriage is a 
socially arranged solution for the problem of getting people to stay to-
gether and care for children. . .”369—still has a grip on our collective 
consciousness.
But families are formed for lots of reasons, many of which have 
nothing to do with children.370 Extending legal protections to commit-
ted adult relationships (horizontal) is a separate inquiry entirely. 
ing Face of Marriage, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF FAMILY LAW AND POLICY 9
(John Eekelaar & Rob George eds., 2014) (providing that research shows that 
“[m]ost of the marital advantage can . . . be explained by partner characteristics that 
precede family formation.”).
367. Cf. Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV.
1185, 1213 (2016).
368. Same-sex couples fighting for the right to marry argued that they had the same capac-
ity to love and raise children as opposite-sex couples, and that children could thrive 
where love, not just heterosexuality, existed. See id. at 1241. To this effect, they did 
not challenge the assumption that marriage is inherently child-centered. But see Chap-
ter 4: Marriage and Parenting, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 13, 2013), http://
www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/06/13/chapter-4-marriage-and-parenting/ (last visit-
ed Nov. 11, 2018) (presenting research which shows that LGBT respondents are far 
less likely to say that “having children” is an important reason for getting married 
(28%), as compared to non-LGBT respondents (49%)).
369. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2613 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (cit-
ing JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM: HOW OUR CULTURE HAS 
WEAKENED FAMILIES 41 (2002).).
370. POLIKOFF, supra note 5, at 141 (“Adults build relationships for purposes other than 
childrearing.”). Scholars have argued that the very notion of marriage is now torn be-
tween two competing visions. On the one side is the “conjugal model” of marriage (a 
sexual union between a man and woman) that is essentially child-centered. See CERE,
supra note 365, at 7. On the other side is the “close relationship model” of marriage, 
which sees marriage as “a private relationship between two people created primarily 
to satisfy the needs of adults.” Id. Under the latter approach, even if children do arise 
from the union they are not seen as an inherent or necessary part of the relationship. 
Id. at 7–8. The close relationship model’s vision of marriage has received constitu-
tional aegis in both Canada and the U.S. See Halpern v. Att’y Gen. of Canada, 
[2003] O.J. No. 2268 (Can. Ont.); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 
941, 961–64 (2003). For a brief discussion of the Demographic Transition Theory, 
see Dudley Kirk, Demographic Transition Theory, 50 POPULATION STUD. 361 (1996) 
(arguing that a decline in birth in modern times derives from the fact that living 
standards, medicine and technology improve mortality rates before—and quicker 
than—they influence fertility). Kirk’s argument was deemed unsatisfactory by many 
prominent feminist theorists. See e.g., Alison Mackinnon, Were Women Present at the 
Demographic Transition? Questions from a Feminist Historian to Historical Demogra-
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The rationale for protecting families with dependent children is 
wholly different from the rationale for protecting adult-adult horizontal 
relationships.371 The two dimensions ought to be separated. I would 
thus discard all objections based on childrearing and procreation as off-
topic, deserving of special—and separate—consideration.
B. Reframing Political Action
1. The Unsuitability of Marriage 
As I argued in the introductory note, queer activists and new fami-
lies should not seek to pattern their political action after the marriage 
equality movement. When considering legal options for protecting non-
normative family units, marriage is an unsuitable option. I do not argue 
for the abolition of marriage, which would still be available to couples—
both gay and straight—who are willing to marry. I merely contend that 
marriage is not well-suited to these non-normative relationships, and 
would suggest that activists spend their energy elsewhere. 
At present in the U.S. bigamy is a crime.372 Marriage between sib-
lings or other close relatives—although defined by different degrees of 
consanguinity from state to state373—is also prohibited under incest 
laws.374 Under the current legal framework in the U.S., some non-
normative dyadic couples such as friends or distant relatives could resort 
to marriage to gain state protection. However, because they lack a sexual 
component to their relationship, the couple would always face legal an-
phers, 7 GEND. & HISTORY 222, 224–25 (1995). For an overview of the psychologi-
cal perspective on the declining birth rate, see e.g., Ellen Walker, Childfree Trend on 
the Rise: Four Reasons Why!, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Jan. 19, 2014), https://
www.psychologytoday.com/intl/blog/complete-without-kids/201401/childfree-trend-
the-rise-four-reasons-why (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
371. See e.g. POLIKOFF, supra note 5, at 142–43 (noting the differing rationales for accord-
ing public benefits to families).
372. See, e.g., Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1190, 1234 (D. Utah 2013) (up-
holding Utah’s prohibition of bigamy in the “literal sense” and striking down the co-
habitation prong of the Utah criminal statute as contrary to the free exercise of reli-
gion under the First Amendment and due process under the Fourteenth Amend-
Amendment).
373. See, e.g., In re Estate of May, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953) (applying the “contrary to natural 
law” exception to the applicability of the lex loci to a marriage contracted in Rhode 
Island, and valid under the state law, between an uncle and a niece, then deceased in 
New York, where such marriage was incestuous).
374. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 180 (2016).
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nulment on grounds of marriage fraud, because the state could argue 
that they married to get government benefits.375 Such a threat is not un-
heard of: Courts have deemed couples to be in fraudulent, spurious 
marriages that were not entered into in good faith.376 These decisions 
have arisen in the context of immigration proceedings,377 judicial inquir-
ies into a spousal evidentiary privilege,378 and housing allowances.379 In 
these cases, the major test is whether the “couple intended to live to-
gether as husband and wife,” by which the court means that they engage 
in a sexual relationship.380 The state of marriage laws is therefore clearly 
inadequate to support new families, and even if they were radically up-
dated, I believe that marriage would still not be the best solution. 
To start, marriage has a vexed history of exclusion and discrimina-
tion.381 The recent struggles over extending marriage to same-sex cou-
ples have revealed some of these deep structural flaws. By removing 
non-normative relationships from the marital space, we can side-step 
many of the most hurtful and pitched battles over culture, religion, and 
morality. Recognizing new families through a vehicle other than mar-
riage can only help to make the process less controversial.  
Furthermore, I believe that there are structural differences between 
non-normative relationships and those relationships that have sought 
recognition through marriage, namely conjugal couples. 
First, new families are different from conjugal couples in many 
respects: They may not yearn for social recognition or for assimilation 
375. Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2012) (referring not to 
the contract-based doctrine of marriage frauds, which leads to the annulment of the 
marriage, but to the different doctrines addressing “sham” marriages developed in 
welfare law, social security law, and immigration law, in the twentieth century in the 
United States.); cf. United States v. Bolden, 23 M.J. 852, 854 (A.F.C.M.R. 1987) 
(“If the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the 
outside world, they have never really agreed to be married at all.”).
376. Abrams, supra note 375, at 5.
377. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 615 (1953) (holding that in the immigration 
context of the case, “the common-law rule prohibiting anti-spousal testimony has no 
application.”).
378. United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1975).
379. United States v. Hall, 74 M.J. 525, 529 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2014).
380. Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 614. The Obergefell decision modifies the definition in the sense 
that the new definition of a non-fraudulent marriage is case in gender-neutral terms 
(wife and wife or husband and husband) in addition to husband and wife. See Ober-
gefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015).
381. See generally BARRY supra note 23; Hamilton supra note 23; Herman supra note 23; 
METZ supra note 22.
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into a heteronormative relationship.382 New families can be vastly 
different from each other, such that the parties are sexually involved or 
not, are related or not, are exclusive of other romantic partners or not, 
and are economically interdependent or not.383 Marriage is simply not 
built to accommodate such a diversity of family arrangements. 
Second, given this heterogony, new families are unlikely to be able 
to develop a group identity. This is distinct from same-sex couples, who 
have successfully mobilized to form what political scientists and sociolo-
gists call “identity politics”—group political activism based on a sense of 
collective, shared identity, rather than an interest.384 Such identity-based 
claims are likely to be unserviceable for the many new family units. 
Since new families are extremely diverse, it is unlikely that new families 
feel they belong to an identifiable group, at least at present.385 Two el-
derly sisters who decide to seek legal recognition as a family unit in or-
der to offer each other social security benefits are not likely to see them-
selves as fighting the same fight as a group of young people in a 
polyamorous relationship. As indicated above,386 I believe the same issue 
underlies the reason why non-conjugal families in Alberta seem to never 
bring suit under AIRA, despite their inclusion under the law.387 The dis-
appearance of non-traditional families (in those cases, non-conjugal 
families) from the case law could be linked to a lack of awareness that 
they constitute a family at all.
382. The ideal of the romantic, heteronormative, dyadic relationship has been central in 
the critiques of the feminist, queer, and family law scholarship in the past decades. 
See Goldberg, supra note 22 at 224; see generally METZ, supra note 22.
383. See Rosenbury, supra note 60, at 22930; BRENDA COSSMAN & BRUCE RYDER, THE 
LEGAL REGULATION OF ADULT PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS: EVALUATING POLICY 
OBJECTS AND LEGAL OPTIONS IN FEDERAL LEGISLATION 19394 (2000), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=1740122.
384. See generally Mary Bernstein, Identity Politics, 31 ANN. REV. SOC. 47 (2005).
385. Leckey, supra note 53, at 31 (“Other kinds of relationship potentially relevant to fam-
ily policy—for example, people “living together apart,” persons with disabilities and 
their caregivers—may have neither the group identity nor the desire to assimilate into 
existing categories.”).
386. See infra Section II.B.
387. I have reached the same conclusion elsewhere, in my Ph.D. dissertation, upon exami-
nation of a similar New Brunswick scheme concerning spousal support. Under Arti-
cle 112(3) of the Family Services Act, “Two persons, not being married to each other, 
who have lived together (a) continuously for a period of not less than three years in a 
family relationship in which one person has been substantially dependent upon the 
other for support, or (b) in a family relationship of some permanence where there is a 
child born of whom they are the natural parents, and have lived together in that rela-
tionship within the preceding year, have the same obligation as that set out in subsec-
tion (1) [an obligation to provide support for himself or herself and for the other 
spouse].” Family Services Act, S.N.B. 1980, c F-2.2 (Can.).
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For the foregoing reasons, it is hard to foresee new families devel-
oping identity-based claims in the near future.388 The marriage equality 
movement, while inspiring in its success, is therefore an unavailing 
model for most non-normative families. 
2. Proposed Remedies
I believe that the best way to provide legal recognition to new fami-
lies will be via the contractual model, through legislation patterned gen-
erally after the proposed bills in Alabama (2015–2016 version) and Mis-
souri—but without their narrow conditions of eligibility. Before the 
introduction of same-sex marriage in the U.S., some legal scholars had 
the intuition that it would have been preferable for same-sex couples to 
keep civil marriage for heterosexual couples only, and to craft alternative 
regimes for same-sex couples.389 However, they largely focused on civil 
unions as the most viable alternative, mostly to elude the intense con-
flict sparked by the same-sex marriage debate.390 By contrast, I contend 
that a designated beneficiary scheme, particularly the version offered by 
Colorado, holds more potential for new families than traditional civil 
unions.
Both proposals are formal models of recognition; unlike ascription, 
both models require parties to take affirmative steps to have their union 
recognized. I agree with the chorus of voices—including the Supreme 
Court of Canada391—that have argued that state recognition must be af-
firmatively chosen by the parties.392 I believe this is critical to protecting 
the dignity and autonomy of the parties. And while this point applies to 
all relationships, it acquires special significance in the field of non-
normative relationships, because their characteristics—which can in-
388. See generally Nausica Palazzo, Identity Politics e il Suo Reciproco: Riflessioni Giuridico-
Politiche Sull’attivismo Queer, in PROSPETTIVE INTERDISCIPLINARI SU FORMAZIONE,
UNIVERSITÀ, LAVORO, POLITICHE E MOVIMENTI SOCIALI 625 (Annalisa Murgia & 
Barbara Poggio eds., 2017). Likewise, Professor Leckey argued that a lack of group 
identity in these kinds of relationships could affect new families’ ability to assert their 
rights though a conventional civil rights approach. See also Leckey, supra note 53, at 
31.
389. Greg Johnson, Civil Union, A Reappraisal, 30 VERMONT L. REV. 891, 894 (2006); 
Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case For Abolishing 
Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1162 (2006).
390. Johnson, supra note 389, at 894; Zelinsky, supra note 389, at 1162.
391. ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, supra note 36, at ¶ 161.
392. Nova Scotia (Attorney Gen.) v. Walsh, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325, 355 (Can.) (“Where the 
legislation has the effect of dramatically altering the legal obligations of partners, as 
between themselves, choice must be paramount.”).
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clude fluidity and romantic non-exclusivity—stand at odds with func-
tional recognition. Practically speaking, new kinship unions are simply 
harder for the state to identify than dyadic, conjugal unions. 
One of the many benefits of both contractual and registration 
schemes is their relative simplicity. Under a contractual scheme, such as 
that in the proposed bills in Alabama and Missouri, parties need only 
sign a civil contract declaring that they are in a marital-like relationship, 
and then register it.393 Likewise, under the registration model, like the 
designated beneficiary scheme in Colorado, participants need only fill 
out a simple form, which can be completed without the assistance of an 
attorney.394 In doing so, parties choose which prerogatives and rights to 
assign and which to withhold, so the scheme is very flexible.395 Unfortu-
nately, the system falls short of allowing parties to designate multiple 
beneficiaries, which could be a problem if multiple caregiving relation-
ships co-exist.396 But this rigidity is partially offset by the opportunity 
for new families to customize the bundle of rights and obligations that 
come along with registration, albeit with respect to a single beneficiary.
The Colorado scheme has less narrow eligibility requirements than 
the contracts proposed in Missouri and Alabama, so the scheme shifts 
the focus away from a romanticized, sexual relationship by extending its 
reach to relatives and friends who seek to be in a committed family 
relationship.397 The law also excludes fidelity rights and duties and other 
marital-like obligations from its scope.398
I do not mean to disregard all the shortcomings associated with 
these regimes, especially their excessive rigidity. While a proper opt-out 
system in the case of registration can help parties tailor their bundle of 
rights, duties, and benefits, neither system allows for the designation of 
multiple beneficiaries or for the division of benefits. These flaws are cor-
rectable over time, however, and the process of recognizing new families 
will likely come in waves. Both proposals strike a balance between the 
need to recognize at least some new families and the states’ interests.
393. See infra Section I.C.
394. A sample beneficiary agreement can be found on the website of the City and County 
of Denver. CITY & COUNTY OF DENVER, DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY AGREEMENT 
FORM, https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/777/documents/
MarriageCivilUnions/Designated%20Beneficiary%20Agreement.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2018).
395. Id.
396. See supra Section I.C.2.
397. See supra Section I. A.1, 3.
398. See supra Figure 1.
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3. The Strange Pairing: Notes on Forming Alliances
Queer activists and radical pluralist movements have fought
marriage in the past as an undesirable tool for protecting non-normative
relationships.399 However, the liberationist stances held by queer
activists—opposing marriage on several grounds and even sometimes
advocating for its abolition—have fallen short of advocating for the
introduction of alternatives to marriage such as a designated or
reciprocal beneficiary scheme.400
Non-normative family structures are on the rise, and the reforms
outlined above are all viable legal paths to pursuing recognition of new
families and accommodating family pluralism.401 But in order to suc-
ceed, queer activists and new families should form strategic alliances
with the conservative fringe groups that have shown an interest in ex-
ploring alternative regimes to marriage.402
It is highly likely that the motivation behind bills like those in
Missouri and Alabama was to preserve the socially conservative idea of
marriage as between one man and one woman. Queer activists would be
399. See supra text accompanying notes 24, 26, 29, 30.
400. Id.; Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 69495.
401. The last available census in Canada is illustrative of the changing landscape of fami-
lies in the country. The Vanier Institute, which processed the census data, noticed 
that only 66% of families in Canada include a married couple (while 18% live in a 
common-law marriage and 16% are lone-parent families), and also that family struc-
tures continuously evolve by achieving an unprecedented degree of complexity. 
NATHAN BATTAMS, THE VANIER INSTITUTE OF THE FAMILY, A SNAPSHOT OF FAMILY 
DIVERSITY IN CANADA (2018). While in 2010 only 5.9% of couples were in a non-
marital conjugal union, these couples now account for one fifth of all conjugal (dyad-
ic) couples in the country. STATISTICS CANADA, FAMILIES, HOUSEHOLDS AND 
MARITAL STATUS: KEY RESULTS FROM THE 2016 CENSUS, 1, 4 (Aug. 2, 2017), 
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/170802/dq170802a-eng.htm (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2018). The Institute also noticed that in 2016, 404,000 multi-
generational households in Canada were registered, and that multi-generational fami-
lies were the fastest-growing household type since 2001 (+38%). Likewise, in other 
Western countries, the emergency of non-normative families acts in tandem with the 
decline of marriage. JAY TEACHMAN ET. AL., The Demography of Families, in
HANDBOOK OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 1, 39 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing the de-
cline of marriage in the United States); Claire Miller, Number of People Getting Mar-
ried Is Falling — and Here’s the Reason Why, THE MIRROR (Apr. 27, 2016) https://
www.mirror.co.uk/lifestyle/sex-relationships/number-people-getting-married-falling-
7844282 (referring to the decline of marriage in England and Wales).
402. Some activists proposed as much in the context of the same-sex marriage debate. See 
Jeffrey A. Redding, Queer/Religious Potentials in U.S. Same-Sex Marriage Debates, in
QUEER THEORY: LAW, CULTURE, EMPIRE, 131 (Kimberley Brooks & Robert Leckey 
eds., 2010).
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right to be hurt by such legislation, but it is in their interest to look
beyond the motivation of the law to its possibly beneficial effects. When
conservative groups bend so far to the right to protect traditional
marriage, they unconsciously pursue some progressive objectives which
are consistent with those on the left. For those who believe that
marriage poses a threat to non-normative families, alternate schemes—
even those generated out of animus—have promise.403
This unusual convergence of interests between radical-pluralist ac-
tivists and conservatives has been pointed out in reference to certain Al-
abama judges’ refusal to issue marriage licenses to gay couples.404 In that
instance, one journalist noted the “strange pairing” of conservative
groups and non-normative families.405 The intuition is on point. The
conservative interest in protecting different familial arrangements along-
side marriage is not different from the progressive desire to protect other
non-normative families—only the motivations differ.
Importantly, however, it is also likely that alliances aimed at fur-
thering the interests of non-normative conjugal couples would be com-
plicated to form. Conservative groups maintain a strong opposition to-
ward marriage-like relationships that defy the traditional notion of the
nuclear family.406 This is not to say that such alliances are impossible,
403. If queer activists believe that marriage poses a serious threat to the freedom to decide 
the aspects one’s familyhood, then they should be interested in schemes that pose a 
lesser threat to it. Of course, I do not contend that registration and contracts fully 
avoid normalization—what has been described as the “channelling [sic] function of 
family law.” Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 503 (1992). Extending civil statuses always entails the risk of 
legal labels reducing the “variety and pluralism of kinship practices.” Swennen & 
Croce, supra note 143, at 54950. However, under either contract-based systems or 
registration systems with strong opt-out options, it is the parties themselves who be-
come the “source[s] of their own classification[s].” Id. at 552.
404. Shane Ferro, How Today’s Supreme Court Ruling Brought Uber Conservatives and Rad-
ical Queers Together, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jun. 26, 2015), https://
www.businessinsider.com/gay-marriage-ruling-brought-conservatives-and-radical-
queers-together-2015-6.
405. Id.
406. The reaction of social conservatives to same-sex marriage is one example of this oppo-
sition—another is their reaction to extending marriage to polygamous unions. For 
one example of a conservative Justice’s resistance to plural marriages in constitutional 
doctrine, see Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 2584, 2621 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dis-
senting) (“It is striking how much of the majority’s reasoning would apply with equal 
force to the claim of a fundamental right to plural marriage.”). These slippery-slope 
arguments can also slide into hurtful attacks. See FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
SLIPPERY SLOPE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2004) (“Once marriage is no longer con-
fined to a man and a woman, it is impossible to exclude virtually any relationship be-
tween two or more partners of either sex—even non-human ‘partners.’”).
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but rather that the difference between the two parties will manifest in
the details of a recognition scheme. I argue that the two groups could
still find common ground on the point of introducing alternative re-
gimes to marriage, as long as marriage as a traditional institution was
maintained.
I believe that for any such alliance to work, the queer activists
would need to concede that marriage is not the goal for non-normative
families. Radical pluralist movements and queer activists should empha-
size case law that entrenches marriage as a traditional and privileged in-
stitution—an institution that the state has a legitimate interest in fur-
thering—in order to build such a broad coalition.407 Same-sex marriage
advocacy has been central to entrenching the view that marriage alone
can confer expressive benefits.408 In the U.S., for instance, before the
Supreme Court issued the Obergefell decision, marriage equality advo-
cates succeeded in striking down alternative regimes to marriage under a
separate-but-equal narrative claiming that these statuses fell short of
conveying the dignity and respect that only marriage confers.409
Therefore, it is crucial for queer activists pushing for the introduc-
tion of alternative regimes to marriage to communicate the following to
other movements and to society at large:
(i) marriage ought to be preserved as a traditional institu-
tion;
(ii) alternative regimes to marriage are the most suitable
vehicle to protect new families; and
(iii) such alternative regimes are not second-class to
marriage.
As to the first point, one could wonder what the interest of con-
servative groups is in preserving marriage now that Obergefell has made 
407. North Dakota Fair Hous. Council v. Peterson, 625 N.W.2d 551 (N.D. 2001) (re-
jecting the contention that the state code prohibiting discrimination in housing ap-
plied to unmarried couples); Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 
2013), vacated, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (upholding the constitutionality of 
the Utah criminal law on bigamy, while rejecting the religious cohabitation prong of 
the statute); Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (1976) (“Lest we be misunder-
stood, however, we take this occasion to point out that the structure of society itself 
largely depends upon the institution of marriage, and nothing we have said in this 
opinion should be taken to derogate from that institution.”).
408. See generally Obergefell, 576 U.S. 2584.
409. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 400 (Cal. 2008) (holding that exclusion 
from marriage amounted to a violation of the same-sex couples’ human dignity).
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same-sex marriage available nation-wide.410 I believe that polyamorous 
relationships are the next frontier in family law. It is not inconceivable 
that they will enter into a similar marriage equality “war” soon.411
Hence, the two groups could coalesce around those aspects that ap-
peared to be sticking points in the marriage debate, such as preserving
the label “marriage” for a limited array of relationships (thereby exclud-
ing polyamorous relationships from the institution) or, less radically,
preserving the symbolic benefits of marriage, and its place in culture and
society (yet not in public and private family law) as an archetypal insti-
tution with transcendent meaning.
As to the second point, alternative regimes could be better for the
parties in several respects. They could accommodate family pluralism in
ways that marriage is structurally unable to do. They avoid some of the
costs of assimilation, which are at their zenith in marital arrangements.
They can build in more flexibility.412
This might sound like a difficult needle to thread. I am not arguing
that queer activists simultaneously must convince conservatives that
marriage is the best option, and then convince new families/progressive
activists that marriage is not the best option. I operate from the pre-
sumption that social conservatives already believe that marriage has a
special place is society and that it ought to be preserved as a traditional
institution. Rather, I suggest that queer activists capitalize on many new
families reduced interest in marriage per se. What I advocate is a trade:
conservatives get to preserve traditional marriage for conjugal couples in
exchange for the creation of alternative regimes for new families.
The third point is most crucial, since under the current constitu-
tional doctrine, alternative regimes would always be at risk of being
410. Carl Tobias, Implementing Marriage Equality in America, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 25, 
44 (2015) (“[A] half year after the Justices issued Obergefell, practically every state and 
most local governments have fully implemented the Court’s mandate, even across 
much of the South, which initially appeared most resistant. Few localities have expe-
rienced resistance and for only a brief period.”).
411. See GILLIAN DOUGLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO FAMILY LAW, CLARENDON LAW 
SERIES 3031 (2001); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy 
and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 283 (2005); 
Christian Klesse, Marriage, Law and Polyamory: Rebutting Mononormativity with Sex-
ual Orientation Discourse?, 6 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 1348 (2016); Joanna L. 
Grossman & Lawrence M. Friedman, Is Three Still a Crowd? Polygamy and the Law 
After Obergefell v. Hodges, VERDICT, (July 7, 2015) https://verdict.justia.com/2015/
07/07/is-three-still-a-crowd-polygamy-and-the-law-after-obergefell-v-hodges; see gen-
erally RONALD C. DEN OTTER, BEYOND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PERSPECTIVES ON 
MARITAL POSSIBILITIES (2016) (providing diverse perspectives on the possibilities for 
marriage after the legalization of same-sex marriage).
412. See supra Section II.A.3.
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struck down in violation of a state constitution’s equal protection clause.
However, I believe there are defenses. When courts have struck these
sorts of regimes in the past (such as domestic partnerships or civil un-
ions), they have looked at the inequality of the system relative to mar-
riage.413 In doing so they took into account the individuals’ feelings of
social inferiority and rejection.414 A well-designed alternative scheme
could avoid feelings of social inferiority by providing new families with
a robust scheme of protections. The idea that new families risk experi-
encing feelings of social inferiority overlooks the fact that they might see
material benefits, rather than dignitary benefits, as the ultimate goal.
This has been the case in the context of LGBT activism in Europe and
the United States.415
It is also important to note that the second-class status concern
originated in contexts where domestic partnerships and civil unions
were identical to marriage in terms of the benefits, rights and obligations
set forth under state law.416 They were not genuine alternatives; rather,
they were functionally equivalent regimes that lacked only the label of
marriage. This explains the feeling of discrimination and social
inferiority on the part of same-sex couples. By contrast, truly alternative
schemes would provide a different bundle of rights and obligations,
would set different (hopefully much lighter) rules to police entrance and
exit, and most of all, would not be limited to conjugal couples alone.417
413. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008).
414. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 443 (Cal. 2008); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 
226– 27 (2006) (Poritz, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that:
[b]y excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage, the [s]tate declares 
that it is legitimate to differentiate between their commitments and the 
commitments of heterosexual couples. Ultimately, the message is that 
what same-sex couples have is not as important or as significant as “real”
marriage, that such lesser relationships cannot have the name of mar-
riage.).
415. See Erez Aloni, Incrementalism, Civil Unions, and the Possibility of Predicting Legal 
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 105, 109 
(2010) (“In fact, it seems that the lesson that the theory of small change misses is that 
many European LGB organizations object to same-sex marriage and are more interest-
ed in securing partnership rights for same-sex couples.”) (emphasis added); KATHERINE 
FRANKE, WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY: HOW AFRICAN 
AMERICANS AND GAYS MIISTAKENLY THOUGHT THE RIGHT TO MARRY WOULD SET 
THEM FREE 144-45 (2015).
416. Edward Stein, Marriage or Liberation?: Reflections on Two Strategies in the Struggle for 
Lesbian and Gay Rights and Relationship Recognition, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 567, 587 
(2009).
417. For examples of alternative regimes that are open to both same-sex and cross-sex cou-
ples, see EUROPEAN FAMILY LAW VOLUME II 2 n.2 (Jens M. Scherpe ed., 2016).
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Conclusion
The conservative response to the movement for marriage equality 
for LGBT couples has led to development of new legal alternatives to 
marriage.418 The beneficiary schemes in Vermont and Hawaii were orig-
inally introduced by conservative groups (or as a compromise with con-
servative groups) in response to the gay marriage equality struggle.419
The AIRA in Alberta, Canada, a hybrid ascriptive and registration sys-
tem, was also pushed forward by Christian and conservative move-
ments.420 Recently, the socially conservative groups421 who resisted im-
plementing same-sex marriage have pushed forward proposals for 
alternate regimes in Alabama, Oklahoma, and Missouri. In bending so 
far to the right, these groups have—ironically and unwittingly—reached 
solutions that are consistent with queer activists’ interest in radical plu-
ralist family arrangements. I contend that these initiatives did more than 
enrich the menu of available options for protecting new families. They 
have also become some of the most viable options for protecting these 
families. In particular, I believe that new families and queer activists 
should pursue reforms patterned after the designated beneficiary scheme 
in Colorado or the proposed bills in Alabama and Missouri.
These movements are animated by hurtful notions, but they are 
headed in the right direction. New families and queer advocates should 
418. See supra Section II.
419. In Hawaii, the introduction of a reciprocal benficiary scheme was a tactic used by 
conservatives to avoid the introduction of a partnership or marriage law for same-sex 
couples. See Coleman, supra note 205. Democrats themselves were persuaded that 
marriage ought to be a union of a man and a woman, and yet that some protections 
should have been afforded to same-sex families. For instance, the co-chairman of the 
Hawaii Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Avery B. Chumbley, explained, “On 
Wednesday, I agreed to support a constitutional amendment which would reserve 
marriage to opposite sex couples. I also agreed to support establishing reciprocal 
beneficiary relationships with certain governmental rights and benefits.” Senator 
Avery B. Chumbley, Same-Sex Marriage and Reciprocal Benefits, ALOHA, http://
www.aloha.net/~abc/samesex.html; see also JASON PIERCESON, COURTS, LIBERALISM,
AND RIGHTS: GAY LAW AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 124 
(2005).
420. For instance, the most prominent moral conservative party supporting the reform was 
the Reform/Alliance Party. See LOIS HARDER, AFTER THE NUCLEAR AGE? SOME 
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN FAMILIES AND FAMILY LAW IN CANADA 9 (The 
Vanier Institute for the Family 2011), http://vanierinstitute.ca/wp-content/uploads/
2015/12/CFT_2011-10-00_EN.pdf.
421. Such as the Christian movements in Alberta behind the introduction of AIRA, S.A. 
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aim to build alliances with conservative groups and find common 
ground to introduce such alternative regimes. In doing so, they should 
capitalize on their shared interest in alternatives to marriage, and on 
those aspects that appeared to be sticking points in the marriage debate, 
such as preserving marriage as a traditional institution and preserving 
the label of “marriage” for conjugal couples only.
I predict that polyamorous relationships are the next frontier of 
family law in the U.S. and Canada. That means that now is the time to 
decide what legal regimes we need. “Defending” marriage as a dyadic 
institution is a concession that queer activists should be willing to make 
in order to introduce more flexible and ideologically-neutral regimes. 
With formal recognition, new families could finally emerge in the 
eyes of the law. They could gain material benefits and reduced social 
stigma. This achievement would allow queer activists to fully challenge 
current narrow notions of who is deserving of state recognition. Formal 
recognition is a worthy goal for queer activists in the U.S. and Canada, 
and it would finally align family law with the diverse reality of love and 
commitment in the modern day. 
